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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
Fault Lines of the Revolution 
Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the 
New Libya 
Of all the states affected by the Arab Spring, Libya has 
experienced the deepest transformation to date. The 
diversity of actors emerging on the political scene is 
staggering. Whereas well-defined parties, camps and 
institutions appear to be operating in neighbouring 
Tunisia and Egypt, external observers have trouble 
identifying and placing political actors in the new 
Libya. This is not only due to the confusing array of 
forces and the institutional chaos following the fall 
of Gaddafi. Compared to neighbouring countries 
there is a dearth of published research on the political 
forces that emerged during and after the revolution. 
The present study is conceived as a remedy. It offers 
an analysis of the actors shaping events in Libya today 
and seeks to clarify the interests that drive them, the 
alliances they enter into and the rifts that separate 
them. 
The new Libya is deeply divided. Two opposing 
camps are emerging from a fragmented political 
landscape, each including a wide range of interests. 
Representatives of forces presenting themselves as 
revolutionary seek root-and-branch renewal of the 
political and business elite to their advantage. They 
face a heterogeneous camp of established, moderate 
and conservative forces that aim to draw a line under 
the period of upheaval and fear further loss of in-
fluence to the revolutionaries. This rift runs right 
through the General National Congress (GNC) elected 
in July 2012, but also between individual cities and 
tribes, and between different elements in the security 
sector. Four fields of conflict in which this fault line 
becomes particularly visible are given special atten-
tion in the study: the balance of forces between local 
power centres; the security sector; issues related to 
justice; and control over economic resources. 
At the same time, no national power struggle 
between the two camps is visible. The conflicts remain 
largely confined to the local level or individual sec-
tors. For this central reason Libya’s transition process 
may be drawn-out and highly unstable, but is unlikely 
to lead to war breaking out again, still less to parti-
tion. Local actors dominate the political landscape of 
the new Libya. In some revolutionary strongholds, 
local structures with strong internal cohesion have 
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6 
emerged, while elsewhere local predominance is 
highly contested. Ethnic minorities and proponents 
of regional autonomy are organising. The balance of 
power between these local and regional actors is still 
being negotiated or fought over. The roots of such con-
flicts often lie in particular cities and tribes having 
found themselves on different sides in the civil war. 
The predominance of jostling local structures and 
their rivalries is reflected at the national level, in-
cluding the GNC and the government formed by 
Prime Minister Ali Zeidan at the end of 2012. Only 
amongst the Islamist currents do we see the emer-
gence of political forces with a clear national agenda. 
Otherwise, parochial interests and shifting coalitions 
dominate the scene. While perceived by some observ-
ers as “liberal”, Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces 
Alliance is in fact an unideological rallying point for 
parts of the establishment that can be broken down 
into local networks. The revolutionary camp is also 
internally divided into factions, mostly on the basis 
of local interests but in some cases also ideology. 
The following analysis is by nature a snapshot, as 
Libya’s political landscape remains very much in flux. 
The results of the July 2012 elections tell us only so 
much about the future party-political system. Within 
the GNC alliances and parliamentary blocs continue to 
emerge and collapse. Outside the GNC, new parties are 
forming. Many revolutionary leaders remain in the 
security sector; whether they will switch to civilian 
politics remains unclear. But the importance of local 
interests and the government’s vulnerability to the 
demands of local actors are likely to remain a key 
feature of Libyan politics for years to come. This also 
applies to the rift between the revolutionary camp and 
its opponents. These lines of conflict will in all likeli-
hood dominate the upcoming constitutional process. 
The distribution of power between the national, 
regional and local levels and the rights of ethnic 
minorities will be central. By contrast, the question 
of the role of Islam contains much less potential for 
conflict than in Egypt or Tunisia. 
Political fragmentation and ongoing power strug-
gles create numerous difficulties for external actors 
seeking to support the transition. Identifying poten-
tial partners is difficult, and most nascent institutions 
are politicised in one way or another. The security 
sector and transitional justice are rightly among 
the priority areas of the UN support mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL) and bilateral partners, as well as inter-
national non-governmental organisations. But in the 
security sector, in particular, inadequately coordi-
nated external support for different Libyan institu-
tions and units risks exacerbating the chaos on the 
Libyan side. On the whole, the focus of external 
assistance should not be on individual actors, but on 
helping establish structures of accountability and 
forums for dialogue – institutions and processes that 
can bridge the rifts of the civil war. 
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7 
Parameters of the Transition 
 
Libya’s political landscape is undergoing a sweeping 
reconfiguration amidst revolutionary upheaval. 
During the revolution, the old state’s administration 
and security apparatus collapsed entirely or in part. 
Temporary or informal arrangements are filling the 
gap until a constitution has been worked out and 
permanent institutions established. 
The transition’s cornerstones were initially defined 
by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in its Con-
stitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011. The tran-
sition began formally with the declaration of Libya’s 
liberation on 23 October 2011, three days after the 
killing of Muammer Gaddafi. Until the election of the 
GNC on 7 July 2012 and its inaugural session a month 
later, the process closely followed the Constitutional 
Declaration. But prolonged negotiations over the com-
position of the new government introduced consider-
able delays. After Mustafa Abushagur failed to form 
a government, the cabinet of Ali Zeidan was finally 
sworn in on 14 November 2012.1 
Controversy erupted over the formal framework for 
the constitutional process. According to the timetable 
set out by the Constitutional Declaration, the GNC 
should within one month of its inaugural session have 
appointed a committee to write a new constitution, 
which was in turn to present a draft constitution with-
in two months. Under threat of an election boycott by 
the federalist movement in the north-east, the NTC 
unexpectedly amended the terms of the constitutional 
process shortly before polling day, to have the Consti-
tutional Committee elected directly by the people. The 
decision remained controversial and was not formally 
confirmed by the GNC until April 2013. The frame-
work for the planned elections to the Committee is 
likely to require further lengthy negotiations.2 
 
1  Because of rulings and ongoing investigations of the In-
tegrity Commission (see “Conflicts over Justice and Recon-
ciliation”, p. 30) and the withdrawal of one candidate, only 
twenty-two of the thirty-one ministers were sworn in on 
14 November 2012. By May 2013, one post was still vacant. 
2  The issues include the boundaries and weighting of the 
constituencies, the criteria for admitting candidates and 
what quotas there should be for particular groups, such as 
women or ethnic minorities. These issues are further com-
plicated by the Constitutional Declaration’s requirement that 
These delays raise questions over other provisions 
of the Constitutional Declaration, including the 
schedule for the constitution’s approval by the GNC, 
which the NTC already extended to four months in 
March 2012. The intervals to the constitutional 
referendum and the subsequent elections are also in 
doubt.3 The transitional process is certain to drag on 
beyond 2013, with the first elections under the new 
constitution unlikely to be held before the second half 
of 2014 even if everything goes smoothly. Until then 
Libya’s political actors will be operating in a consti-
tutional vacuum and institutional chaos. 
There is a direct connection between institutional 
disorder and the armed conflicts in numerous parts 
of the country. The security sector is a patchwork of 
units composed of civilians and remnants of the 
armed forces that are developing their own interests. 
Most of the revolutionary brigades, as well as the mili-
tias that emerged after the fall of the regime, are now 
under the control of the Interior or Defence Ministry. 
But the ministries’ control is precarious because many 
of the militias were integrated wholesale and retain 
their own structures. When fighting breaks out, 
the adversaries are almost always to be found in the 
murky spectrum between official and semi-official 
forces. Paralysis in the legal system and its vulner-
ability to threats made by armed actors contribute 
to conflict escalation. The government has neither 
neutral, professional security forces, nor can it hand 
suspects over to the courts. 
The problems in the security sector and justice 
system represent the most urgent challenges of the 
current phase, and are granted special weight in the 
following analysis. Moreover, specific attention is 
given to armed actors and the potential for political 
conflicts escalating into violent confrontations. 
 
the sixty-member Committee should include twenty mem-
bers for each of Libya’s three historic regions – whose borders 
are not uncontested either. 
3  According to the Constitutional Declaration the referen-
dum was to be held one month after acceptance of the con-
stitution by the GNC. New elections under the constitution 
were scheduled for seven months after the referendum. 
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Map 
Towns and regions in Libya 
 
 
 
 
Camps and Interests in Congress and Government 
SWP Berlin 
Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya 
May 2013 
 
 
 
9 
Political Forces in the New Libya 
 
The 17th February Revolution has fundamentally 
reshaped Libya’s political landscape. Local non-state 
actors have been among the leading drivers of change: 
local councils, tribal forums, revolutionary brigades. 
The Islamist spectrum has also grown in strength, 
and its forces have organised on a national basis. 
The elitist political leadership that brought together 
members of the exiled opposition and high-ranking 
defectors to form the National Transitional Council 
(NTC) in February/March 2011 in Benghazi was over-
run by these developments. The NTC quickly gained 
international recognition and support, but failed 
to build close relations with the local councils and 
brigades leading the revolutionary struggle. This 
generated great tensions between the revolutionary 
base and the political leadership. After the civil war 
ended, many figures who had been involved with the 
former regime as senior officials, diplomats or tech-
nocrats came under increasing pressure, even though 
their early defections had contributed to the success 
of the revolution. Many members of the NTC and the 
governments of Mahmoud Jibril (March to November 
2011) and Abdel Rahim al-Kib (November 2011 to 
November 2012) were forced out of the political arena 
by actors with a local power base, whether through 
public pressure or as a result of elections.4 
Camps and Interests in Congress and 
Government 
An analysis of the composition of the National Con-
gress reveals a picture of fragmentation. Apart from 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, there are no 
ideologically defined camps; individual interests and 
shifting alliances characterise the scene. Libya’s politi-
cal parties were only able to develop after the fall 
of the regime. The electoral law of January 2012 took 
account of the weakness of national political forces 
with a voting system in which three-fifths of the two 
 
4  On the sociological composition of the revolutionary 
camp during the civil war, see Wolfram Lacher, “Families, 
Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution”, Middle East 
Policy 18, no. 4 (winter 2011): 140–54. 
hundred members of the GNC were elected as in-
dependent constituency representatives and two-fifths 
via party lists. Given that party lists were not required 
to stand candidates in more than one constituency, 
many of these were also local interest groups. Four-
teen of the eighty members elected via lists fall into 
this category. Even Prime Minister Zeidan’s list, which 
stood candidates in numerous constituencies, suc-
ceeded in winning seats only in Zeidan’s home con-
stituency of Jufra.5 On the other hand, members of 
several parties were also elected as independents. 
 
Balance of forces in the GNC 
Table 1 
Party lists 
National Forces Alliance  39
Justice and Construction (Muslim Brotherhood)  17
Smaller national lists  6
Salafi party lists  4
Local interest groups  14
Total  80
Table 2 
Independents 
Associated with National Forces Alliance  25 
Associated with Justice and Construction  17 
Salafis, independent or associated with 
party lists 
 23 
Genuine independents  55 
Total  120 
 
Apart from a number of prominent individuals, 
and figures with a clear Islamist profile, most of the 
independents represent the interests of individual 
cities, tribes or families. Almost two-thirds of indepen-
dents won their seats with less than 20 percent of the 
 
5  Zeidan’s National Party for Development and Welfare 
(Hizb al-Watan lil-Tanmiya wal-Rafah) won one seat via the party 
list. Zeidan himself was elected as an independent member 
for Jufra. 
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Graphic 
Balance of forces in the GNC 
 
votes, and more than half of those did not even gain 
10 percent. Outside the big cities of the north-west, 
tribal loyalties were often the deciding factor. In 
Benghazi, for example, six of the nine independents, 
each of them associated with a particular tribe or 
party, were elected on less than 2 percent of the votes.6 
Each of the four independents from Sabha represents 
a different local tribal constituency; the situation is 
similar in Murzuq and Ubari. In Kufra and Bani Walid, 
which each elected two members with respectable 
shares of the vote, agreements between tribal leaders 
to back particular candidates were ratified via the bal-
lot box. In Ruhaybat, the candidate of the Arab popu-
lation beat the Berber candidate with 51 percent of 
the vote.7 
In the big cities, many seats were won by members 
of bourgeois and aristocratic families that already 
played a leading role in politics and business before 
Gaddafi’s military coup of 1969. These include Abder-
rahman Swehli and Ali Abdallah al-Dharrat from Mis-
rata, Saleh Jaouda and Ahmad Langhi from Benghazi 
 
6  The electoral law placed no limit on the number of candi-
dates and lists. Each constituency was assigned a particular 
number of seats for independents. The candidates with the 
most votes were elected to the National Congress. 
7  Discussions with activists and officials from Kufra and 
Bani Walid, as well as Professors Zahi Mogherbi and Fathi 
Bouzkhar, Benghazi, Bani Walid and Tripoli; November 2012. 
and Abdeljalil Saif al-Nasr from Sabha. At least to some 
extent, they should be regarded as representing polit-
ical and business networks led by their respective 
families. 
Ideological Camps and Tactical Alliances 
Western media presented the election result as a vic-
tory for the “liberals” – Mahmoud Jibril’s National 
Forces Alliance (NFA) – over the Islamists. That inter-
pretation is misleading for several reasons. First, 
representatives of the interests of individual families, 
cities and tribes were the true winners. Second, the 
term “liberal” in the European sense applies at best 
to a minority of those elected to congress with the 
NFA or as associated independents. Third, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafis together gained a greater 
share of the nominally independent members than 
the Alliance. 
The principal reason why the NFA gained by far the 
greatest share of party list votes was Jibril’s personal 
popularity. Beyond that, the outcome can also be seen 
as a vote against the Islamist parties without this being 
a vote for liberal, let alone secular values. Neither the 
Alliance nor other parties campaigned on liberal pol-
icies. When Mohamed Magariaf, president of the GNC, 
was quoted as saying that Libya should become a secu-
National Forces 
Alliance
Justice and 
Construction
Smaller 
national lists
Salafi party lists
Local interest groups
Independents –
associated with 
Justice and 
Construction
Independents –
associated with 
National Forces 
Alliance
Independents –
Salafists 
(including members 
of parties)
Genuine 
Independents 
Independents
(see graph on 
right hand side)
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11 
lar state, Alliance deputies joined the Muslim Brother-
hood in protesting.8 The Alliance statutes recognise 
democracy and the sharia as the main source of law, 
and are no different from the programmes of dozens 
of other new parties. 
The profiles of Alliance leaders and GNC members 
are more revealing. After Jibril, Abdel Majid Mlegta 
is one of its most important figures and biggest spon-
sors. Mlegta, a businessman with roots in the western 
city of Zintan, maintained good relations with the 
Gaddafi regime but founded a revolutionary brigade 
in his home town when the uprising began and later 
participated actively in the liberation of Tripoli.9 The 
Alliance’s parliamentarians include both young, well-
educated and older figures. What they have in com-
mon is belonging to an economically privileged class 
and prominent families. Well-known representatives 
of the former exiled opposition are absent; instead 
the NFA builds on prominent local figures. Its leading 
candidate in Benghazi, Ahmad Bensoued, has no polit-
ical background, but was one of the city’s most popu-
lar football stars. The member for central Tripoli, 
Abdellatif al-Muhalhil, is a leading scholar of the 
Libyan Sufis.10 The Alliance can best be understood as 
an unideological electoral coalition of those parts of 
the elites that remained in Libya during the Gaddafi 
era, and for this reason had to find some kind of 
accommodation with the regime. Several NFA parlia-
mentarians were local officials under the old regime. 
Two were stripped of office for that reason by the In-
tegrity Commission, which investigates the role of 
Gaddafi-era officials, as were two of the five ministers 
the Alliance nominated to the Zeidan cabinet.11 
 
8  “National Congress Protests Statements by Magariaf”, 
al-Tadhamon, 2 October 2012, tinyurl.com/coj43vx (Arab-
language titles of newspaper articles are translated into 
English throughout). 
9  The Qa’qa’ brigade founded by Mlegta is today led by his 
brother Othman, who was a local functionary under the old 
regime. The brigade, most of whose members come from Zin-
tan, guards several important facilities in Tripoli, including 
the seat of a major media outlet close to the NFA. It is also 
notorious for making illegal arrests and seizing state prop-
erty. 
10  His political opponents from the Salafi camp accuse 
al-Muhalhil of speaking in support of the regime on state 
television at the beginning of the revolution. “Sufism” 
designates a spectrum of interpretations of Islam that are 
rooted in local traditions, often involve brotherhoods, and 
lean towards mysticism. Salafis regard Sufism as a heresy. 
11  These were the designated minister of higher education, 
Abdessalam al-Dueibi, and the secretary of state for parlia-
mentary affairs, Muizz al-Khuja. Khuja successfully appealed 
Both the Alliance and the Justice and Construction 
party of the Muslim Brotherhood wield greater in-
fluence in the GNC than their official numbers would 
suggest. Many of their prominent members stood 
as independents, reckoning that this improved their 
chances. Certain less well-known candidates were 
elected with financial support from one or other 
party, and are now expected to be loyal. Including 
their associated independents, the Alliance and the 
Muslim Brotherhood together probably account 
for about half the seats. But the balance of forces 
depicted above should be regarded as approximative. 
In political practice the real size of parliamentary 
groups varies, with the Alliance in particular lacking 
internal discipline. This became clear in the process 
of appointing the cabinet. In September 2012 the 
Alliance leadership was divided over whether to par-
ticipate in Abushagur’s government. Mlegta and Jibril 
were strongly opposed, while Alliance Secretary-Gen-
eral Faisal Krekshi had himself nominated as a minis-
ter.12 Tellingly, Zeidan avoided relying solely on the 
two main groupings, and also sought support among 
independent representatives of particular regions and 
cities. Nonetheless, his government was elected with 
only 105 votes in the 200-member GNC; 58 abstained. 
Internal cohesion is much stronger within the Jus-
tice and Construction Party, many of whose deputies, 
ministers and leading activists spent years in prison 
together under Gaddafi. Those who entered the 
National Congress as independents exhibit much 
stronger loyalty than the associated independents 
of the Alliance. In the person of Nizar Kawan, an in-
dependent was even elected head of the Justice and 
Construction parliamentary group. 
The third clearly identifiable camp is the Salafis, 
who are estimated at twenty-seven members and are 
strongest in Tripoli and Zawiya. This is not, however, 
a homogeneous bloc. The ten members associated 
with the al-Asala (“authenticity”) movement are espe-
cially influential. Al-Asala is closely allied with Grand 
Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariani. Its representatives were 
elected above all in greater Tripoli, where they took 
 
to the Supreme Court and took office in February 2013, along 
with another Alliance cabinet member, Religious Affairs Min-
ister Abdessalam Abusaad, who also had to endure a pro-
longed investigation by the Integrity Commission. Abusaad 
resigned soon after assuming office. 
12  “Mlegta: Alliance of National Forces in Libya Will Not Join 
Abushagur Cabinet”, Reuters, 18 September 2012; “Abushagur 
Presents Cabinet to National Congress”, al-Tadhamon, 4 Octo-
ber 2012, tinyurl.com/d54mpm8. 
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12 
eight of the fourteen seats for independents.13 A sec-
ond network, linked to the milieu of the former 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), comprises Salafi 
revolutionaries who participated actively in the battle 
against the regime. Of these, only Abdel Wahab Qaid 
from Murzuq is a former leading LIFG member.14 
Others did not belong to the LIFG, but can be con-
sidered close to its circles, such as Salah Badi from 
Misrata, two former commanders of revolutionary 
brigades from Zawiya,15 and five independents as-
sociated with the al-Watan Party of Abdel Hakim Bel-
hadj.16 There are also several independents who 
position themselves between the Salafis and the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, including Mohammed al-Walid from 
Zliten, the chair of the religious affairs committee. 
Among those smaller parties and independents 
that are not clearly linked to either the Salafis or the 
Muslim Brotherhood, temporary and regional alli-
ances predominate. The National Front of Mohamed 
Magariaf won three party list seats, and several in-
dependents are also members of the party: represen-
tatives of prominent families who were active in the 
exiled opposition.17 But the National Front does not 
operate as a parliamentary group; instead, it has 
entered into shifting alliances with independents.18 
Other blocs have emerged and disappeared again. 
 
13  Al-Asala, “The Names of the Candidates Supported by 
al-Asala”, 27 June 2012, tinyurl.com/csg9rna. 
14  Abdel Wahab Qaid is a former high-ranking LIFG member. 
His younger brother was a leading member of al-Qaeda 
known as Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was killed in 2012 in Paki-
stan. After the fall of the regime Qaid became commander 
of the border guards in southern Libya. He is associated with 
the Umma Party, which was founded by a group of former 
members of the Fighting Group and led by Sami al-Saadi, 
formerly the LIFG’s religious authority. Al-Saadi was nomi-
nated by Zeidan as Minister for Martyrs’ and Missing Persons’ 
Affairs, but resigned in protest at the composition of the 
cabinet. 
15  These are the independents Mohammed al-Kilani and 
Mustafa al-Treiki, respectively commander and leading mem-
ber of the Zawiya Martyrs Brigade. 
16  Belhadj is a former LIFG leader and played an active role 
in the liberation of Tripoli. He is one of the most prominent 
figures in al-Watan, which also includes non-Islamist figures. 
The party’s failure to win a single list seat has triggered a 
reorientation among its leaders, which may contribute to a 
shake-up of the Salafi political spectrum. 
17  The National Front is the successor to the National Front 
for the Salvation of Libya (al-Jabha al-Wataniya li-Inqadh Libya), 
which was long the most important organisation of the exile 
opposition. Magariaf is president of the GNC. 
18  Discussion with party leader Mohamed Ali Abdallah 
al-Dharrat, Tripoli, November 2012. 
While the cabinet was being put together, a group of 
fifteen independents from the north-east was able to 
nominate the agriculture minister in return for its 
support. Mohammed Bitro from Zintan assembled the 
Working Together Group, whose members stand close 
to the Alliance. After the cabinet had been appointed, 
a small group largely from Sirte, Jufra and Sidra 
formed around Saleh Misbah, a deputy from Sirte.19 
Since early 2013, these short-lived alliances have 
coalesced into two larger blocs – both of which, how-
ever, represent alliances on specific policy issues on-
ly, and are unlikely to outlast the realisation of their 
short-term goals. At the end of January 2013, the 
“Promise to the Martyrs” bloc formed to pursue the 
specific goals of ensuring the election of a Constitu-
tional Committee and the direct election of provincial 
governors and mayors, as well as push for the law of 
“political exclusion” (al-‘Azl al-Siyasi), which would bar 
Gaddafi-era officials from positions in politics, busi-
ness, administration and the security organs. The 
bloc, comprising forty to fifty GNC members, includes 
a majority of the Salafis, National Front members, 
as well as representatives of local interests from the 
north-east and the Berber towns of the Nafusa Moun-
tains. To counterbalance the bloc’s demands for a 
sweeping exclusion of former regime officials, another 
larger bloc formed, “My Country” (Ya Biladi), drawing 
mainly on independents from southern and central 
Libya, as well as those close to the Alliance. The emer-
gence of these blocs revealed what is the most salient 
divide in Libya’s political landscape today. 
Fault Lines of the Revolution 
The most significant fault line in the GNC runs 
neither between the major parties nor between 
Islamists and non-Islamists per se. Instead, the rifts 
created by revolution and civil war also define the 
camps within the GNC. On one side stand most of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, as well as former 
members of the exile opposition and representatives 
of cities and neighbourhoods that were strongholds 
of armed struggle against the regime during the revo-
lution – such as Misrata and Zawiya, the Berber cities 
of the Nafusa Mountains and the Souq al-Jum’a and 
Tajoura districts of Tripoli. They all take a hard line 
against those parts of the elite who had come to terms 
with the Gaddafi regime. 
 
19  Discussion with GNC members, Tripoli, November 2012. 
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On the other side are deputies representing cities 
or tribes that supported the regime or abstained 
from joining the revolution, such as large parts of the 
southern Fezzan region and the cities of Sirte, Bani 
Walid, Tarhouna and Aziziya. In line with its leaders’ 
own interests, the National Forces Alliance pursues a 
moderate line on the question of how comprehen-
sively former regime officials should be excluded from 
politics and administration. The divide is also clearly 
apparent in the decisions of the Integrity Commission: 
nine of the fifteen members excluded from the GNC 
came from cities or regions that were on the losing 
side of the revolution; three others were members of 
the Alliance, or independent but associated with the 
Alliance.20 Owing to Integrity Commission decisions, 
the Tuareg had no representation in the GNC from 
September 2012 until this study went to press in May 
2013, and both members for the town of Bani Walid 
had been disbarred by January 2013. Such constituen-
cies were thus unable to exert any influence on cabi-
net appointments or the debate over the constitu-
tional process. 
The revolutionary camp was behind the decision of 
October 2012 to storm Bani Walid following the death 
of a revolutionary from Misrata held hostage there. 
The GNC’s “Decision No. 7” opened the way for a mili-
tary offensive that ended in the looting and destruc-
tion of public institutions, businesses and homes in 
Bani Walid by militias from Misrata and other revo-
lutionary strongholds.21 The decision received strong 
support from deputies from Misrata, Zliten, Zawiya, 
Souq al-Jum’a and Tajoura – the cities and districts 
whose brigades then led the offensive against Bani 
Walid in the guise of Der’ Libya units. Only about two-
thirds of GNC members were present; many left the 
chamber shortly beforehand in order to avoid having 
to vote. The resolution was accepted with 65 votes in 
favour, just seven against, and about 55 abstentions.22 
Despite this relatively weak support within the GNC, 
the military power of the revolutionary camp and the 
close connections between certain deputies and the 
 
20  Independent members from Bayda, Baten al-Jabal, 
Bouslim, Hay al-Andalus, Sabha, Tarhouna and Ubari were 
excluded, along with all the independents from Ghat and 
Bani Walid, two representatives of local lists from Ubari 
and Wadi al-Shate’, and two Alliance deputies from Zliten 
and Bouslim. By March 2013 one excluded member from 
Bayda had been replaced; all other seats remained vacant. 
21  Discussions and observations, Bani Walid, November 
2012. 
22  Discussions with GNC members, Tripoli, November 2012. 
revolutionary brigades involved made the operation 
possible. Salah Badi from Misrata and Mohamed 
al-Kilani from Zawiya, both leaders of revolutionary 
brigades as well as GNC members, participated 
actively in the military offensive. The GNC spokes-
man, Omar Ahmidan from Zliten, helped disseminate 
false reports about the supposed detention of one of 
Gaddafi’s sons in Bani Walid that were intended to 
lend legitimacy to the military operation. 
“Decision No. 7” and the subsequent offensive 
underlined the deep rifts running through Libyan 
society, and through the National Congress. The divide 
then erupted into the open in the GNC in the debate 
on the “law on political exclusion” (al-’Azl al-Siyasi). The 
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and representatives of 
the revolutionary strongholds demanded sweeping 
exclusion, while the Alliance and many independents 
from the south and centre opposed this. The GNC 
remained deadlocked over the issue between Decem-
ber 2012 and early May 2013, forestalling progress on 
other major policy issues.23 When a vote appeared to 
be close in March 2013, armed protesters surrounded 
the building where the National Congress was meet-
ing – which was supposed to be kept secret that day – 
and attempted to push through a vote on the law at 
gunpoint.24 Revolutionary hard-liners in the National 
Congress almost certainly encouraged the interven-
tion, but parliament refused to vote under such con-
ditions. Both within the GNC and in the broader pub-
lic sphere the controversy over “political exclusion” 
led to an increasing polarisation along the revolution-
ary divide. The law was finally adopted on 5 May 2013, 
in a context of strong pressure from armed groups 
that had barricaded several ministries to push their 
demands for “political exclusion”. Though the result 
of intense bargaining between the Alliance and other 
blocs in the GNC, the law’s crucial first article – defin-
ing the categories of former officials to be barred from 
 
23  “Controversy over Law on Political Exclusion in Libya”, 
al-Jazeera.net, 17 August 2012, www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/ 
f587e240-8894-42e9-9136-f4ad04831fa8; “After Tough Debate 
National Congress Agrees Appointment of 19-Member ‘Ex-
clusion’ Committee”, al-Manara, 26 December 2012, tinyurl. 
com/bsbu388. 
24  “National Congress Deputies Detained: Pressure over 
Law on Political Exclusion ”, Quryna, 6 March 2013, www. 
qurynanew.com/49660. On 7 March, two days after the in-
cident, an armed group attacked the offices of the al-Asema 
TV channel, which had taken an explicit stance against 
sweeping “political exclusion”. The TV station’s owner Jum’a 
al-Usta (a leading donor to the NFA) and its Executive Direc-
tor were abducted and later freed. 
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holding positions of responsibility – passed only with 
a majority of 115 of 157 members who were present. 
The Zeidan Government 
The Zeidan cabinet’s composition reflects the frag-
mentation within the GNC. The prime minister was 
able to win the support of different camps precisely 
because he has no power base of his own in Congress. 
In order to keep the various rival interest groups in 
check, politically independent figures were appointed 
to head the so-called “sovereign” ministries: foreign, 
defence, interior, justice and finance. But otherwise 
the government serves every clientele. The Alliance 
and the Muslim Brotherhood each received five minis-
terial posts, with two each for the cities of Misrata and 
Zintan. Two ministries went to members of Mohamed 
Magariaf’s National Front, one of whom can also be 
regarded as a representative of the Berbers. With 
the appointment of former LIFG chief theorist Sami 
al-Saadi as minister for martyrs’ and missing persons’ 
affairs, and, after his resignation, his replacement by 
Ali Qaddour, the Salafi camp is represented in the 
government, alongside the Sufi Abdessalam Abusaad – 
although Abusaad resigned shortly after taking office 
as minister for religious affairs, most likely under 
Salafi pressure. A leading revolutionary figure was 
appointed state minister for the injured in the guise 
of Ramadan Zarmuh, the former head of the Misrata 
military council. Zeidan chose a disproportionate 
number of ministers from the north-east, both to 
ensure the support of deputies from that region and 
to placate the extra-parliamentary federalist move-
ment. So the cabinet emerged as a balancing act 
between various interest groups. The same approach 
continued in the appointment of the deputy ministers 
in the following months. The appointment of career 
army and police officers to the defence and interior 
ministries was balanced by political appointments 
of deputy ministers. Among the three deputy defense 
ministers, for example, feature former leading LIFG 
figure Khaled al-Sharif and al-Tuhami Bouzian, a 
Salafi-Jihadi brigade leader from Misrata.25 Individual 
 
25  Along with Abdel Hakim Belhadj, Sami al-Saadi, Abdel 
Wahab Qaid and other LIFG leaders, al-Sharif had spent sev-
eral years in prison during the Gaddafi era and was released 
before the revolution, after LIFG leaders had declared their 
previous fight against the regime to have been based on erro-
neous religious views. (See Revisions of the Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group, ed. Salman Auda [Cairo, 2010]). After the revolution, 
ministers have specific power bases within and out-
side the GNC, but the government as a whole has 
no firm majority to depend upon. Combined with 
the vaguely defined separation of powers between 
the GNC and the government, this has encouraged the 
GNC to act as a counterweight to the government as a 
whole, and seize powers including the right to decide 
appointments to key positions such as the central 
bank governor, the army chief of staff, or the general 
prosecutor. 
Parliamentary and 
Extra-Parliamentary Islamists 
The Islamist forces within and outside the GNC 
deserve special attention for two reasons. First, this 
spectrum contains the only political forces that have 
a truly national agenda and reach, in contrast with 
the loose alliances of local actors dominating the 
rest of the political landscape. Second, Islamists exert 
strong influence through networks that straddle 
national and local politics, the security sector and 
religious institutions. Many of their opponents believe 
that since the fall of the regime there has been a great 
Islamist plot to gain control over the government and 
security apparatus. But such conspiracy theories lack 
plausibility, for the Islamist spectrum includes a 
multitude of competing currents and organisations. 
The Grand Mufti’s Network and Influence 
The most influential figure in the Islamist spectrum, 
and perhaps in Libyan politics altogether, is the Grand 
Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariani. He was quick to throw his 
support behind the uprising, and in February 2012 the 
National Transitional Council appointed him the first 
director of the refounded Dar al-Ifta’, the authority 
responsible for interpreting Islamic law. The provi-
 
al-Sharif set up the “National Guard” which, under a Transi-
tional Council resolution of February 2012, was later placed 
under the authority of the border guards. According to 
al-Sharif, the “National Guard” has eight thousand members. 
Its responsibilities include guarding high-value Gaddafi-era 
prisoners such as former intelligence chief Abdallah Senoussi 
and former prime minister Baghdadi Mahmoudi. Several 
of the brigades belonging to the “National Guard” are led by 
figures from the Salafi Jihadi spectrum. Bouzian is the leader 
of the Faruq brigade and a former deputy head of the Misrata 
Union of Revolutionaries. 
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sions of the decision underline how great Ghariani’s 
influence already was: he was appointed for life and 
media discussion of his fatwahs was prohibited.26 
Ghariani’s statements and fatwahs exerted a stabi-
lising influence in the months following the fall of the 
regime, condemning attacks on Sufi shrines by radical 
Salafis and killings of officers from Gaddafi’s security 
organs.27 Subsequently, however, he played an in-
creasingly divisive role: the day before the elections 
to the GNC, Ghariani declared that it was un-Islamic 
to vote for parties that intended to restrict the scope 
of sharia, in an obvious attack on the Alliance.28 After 
the elections he campaigned vigorously for an Islamic 
banking system, and thus bolstered corresponding 
initiatives in the GNC. He defended the legitimacy of 
the military action against Bani Walid in October 2012 
and supported calls for a broad ban on former regime 
officials through the law on “political exclusion”; in 
April 2013, he went as far as declaring demonstrations 
in favour of the law to be a religious obligation (fard) 
for Libyans.29 Ghariani has also stoked fears of alleged 
Shiite “infiltration”, pressuring the Ministry of Social 
Affairs into blocking marriages with non-Libyan 
Muslims to avert this supposed danger. Ghariani has 
become increasingly controversial with such posi-
tions. Nevertheless, his stance on sharia and the con-
stitution – that the role of sharia as the source of law 
was not a matter for a referendum – met with little 
in the way of criticism. As there is no secular camp in 
Libya, the constitutional debate is likely to focus main-
ly on whether sharia should be the sole or predomi-
nant source of law. 
Ghariani’s networks extend beyond the deputies 
of the al-Asala movement, who like Ghariani consider 
themselves moderate Salafis. He maintains close rela-
tions with former LIFG leaders, and intervened per-
sonally for an autonomous budget for Siddiq Mab-
rouk, a former LIFG member who served as deputy 
defence minister until January 2013.30 The com-
manders of Mabrouk’s border guards included figures 
 
26  Law No. 15/2012 of the National Transitional Council “On 
the Establishment of a Dar al-Ifta’”, Tripoli, 20 February 2012. 
27  Hanspeter Mattes, “Libyen nach Qaddafi: Islamistischer 
Aufschwung und Stärkung des religiösen Sektors”, in Isla-
mische Akteure in Nordafrika, ed. Sigrid Faath (Berlin, 2012). 
28  Sadeq al-Ghariani, “Friday Address, Oqba Mosque”,  
6 July 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=vidyTP5bsIg. 
29  Public intervention by Ghariani on 4 April 2013, www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=KYFZNruNUO8. 
30  See his address to the first meeting of the Zeidan cabinet 
on 21 November 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwDjw 
N6gh1o. 
formerly associated with the LIFG.31 Prime Minister 
Abdel Rahim al-Kib told the GNC in August 2012 
that the government and security officials agreed that 
the border guards needed to be placed under the 
authority of the chief of staff, but a “higher instance” 
had objected.32 This can only have been referring to 
Ghariani. The border guards were eventually placed 
under the chief of staff after Mabrouk’s removal in 
January 2013, but only after Khaled al-Sharif, a former 
leading LIFG figure who also maintains good relations 
with the Grand Mufti, was appointed deputy defence 
minister. Earlier, Ghariani had also criticised demon-
strations against the presence of Islamist-leaning 
brigades in Benghazi. In short: the Grand Mufti can 
be clearly located in the Islamist spectrum of the 
revolutionary camp. 
A centrist counterpoint to Ghariani is the religious 
scholar Ali Sallabi, who is associated with the inter-
national Muslim Brotherhood – and closely linked 
to the influential Qatar-based scholar Youssef al-Qara-
dawi – though not part of Libyan Muslim Brother-
hood’s network. After briefly dabbling with the initia-
tive to set up the al-Watan Party with forces straddling 
the Salafi and non-Islamist spectrum, Sallabi withdrew 
from party politics. He calls unequivocally for national 
reconciliation, criticises the attempts at a sweeping 
exclusion of former officials, and condemned the use 
of force against Bani Walid.33 Such positions being un-
popular within Islamist currents, Sallabi’s influence 
has declined since the revolution.34 While his brother 
Ismail led a revolutionary brigade in Benghazi, the 
two brothers’ political views clearly diverge, and no 
direct connection should be drawn between Ali Sallabi 
and the Benghazi brigades. 
 
31  These included Abdel Wahab Qaid (see note 14) as the 
commander of the southern region. The full name of the 
border guard is “Guard Force for Borders and Vital Facilities” 
(Haras al-Hudud wal-Mansha’at al-Haiyawia). They include units 
that are deployed around oil and gas facilities. 
32  Questioning of Abdel Rahim al-Kib by the National Con-
gress, Tripoli, 24 August 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
im46xFhV-sI. 
33  Discussion with Ali Sallabi, Tripoli, June 2012; “After 
Events in Bani Walid: Ali Sallabi Calls on Libyans to Press Gov-
ernment to Implement Transitional Justice”, Quryna, 13 Octo-
ber 2012, www.qurynanew.com/43240; “Sallabi to Quds Press: 
Ideas of Victors and Vanquished Cannot Be Basis for Consti-
tution and Reconciliation”, al-Manara, 17 November 2012, 
tinyurl.com/cqnpm6r. 
34  Sallabi is also widely seen as all too close to Qatar, and 
in Salafi Jihadi quarters is criticised for his role in mediating 
on behalf of Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi in connection with the 
LIFG’s ideological recantation. 
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The Influence of Islamist Currents in the 
Security Sector 
While the Muslim Brotherhood cannot compete with 
Ghariani’s broad appeal and religious authority, it 
does exercise considerable influence in important 
areas. The Brotherhood dominates the local council 
in Benghazi, elected in May 2012, and its non-elected 
counterpart in Tripoli, and is strongly represented 
in the new security organs set up after the fall of the 
regime. In September 2011 Abderrezak al-Aradi, a 
leading Muslim Brother and NTC member, helped set 
up the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) in Tripoli. 
Other prominent representatives include Deputy 
Interior Minister Omar al-Khadrawi and the deputy 
head of the Benghazi SSC, Fawzi Wanis al-Gaddafi.35 
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood also led 
revolutionary brigades. The 17th of February Brigade 
from Benghazi, which appeared in the first weeks 
of the revolution, and the Union of Revolutionary 
Brigades that emerged from it were coalitions com-
manded by figures from the Islamist spectrum. But 
they could not be regarded as the Brotherhood’s 
military wing, because they were heterogeneous in 
composition. Their leaders included the Muslim 
Brothers Fawzi Bukatef, Mohammed Shaiter and 
Fawzi Wanis along with individuals from the spec-
trum between the Brotherhood and the LIFG milieu, 
such as Ismail Sallabi or Mohammed al-Gharabi.36 
Since the end of 2011 a number of prominent leaders 
of these brigades have set up the Warriors’ Affairs 
Commission (WAC), which plans to reintegrate the 
revolutionaries in civilian life with a programme 
potentially costing billions.37 
 
35  Khadrawi had been appointed by Kib and has retained 
his position under Zeidan, underlining his influence. Fawzi 
Wanis was initially the leader of SSC Benghazi, but stepped 
down in September 2012 to become deputy leader. 
36  Al-Gharabi is the leader and Ismail Sallabi was the deputy 
leader of the Rafallah Sahati Brigade, which split from the 17th 
of February Brigade after the fall of the regime but joined the 
Der’ Libya under strong public pressure in October 2012; its 
militia structure remains unaltered even after Ismail Sallabi’s 
return to civilian life. Individual units of the 17th of February 
Brigade joined the Der’ Libya, the military police and the intel-
ligence service but retained their internal structures. Discus-
sions with Mohammed al-Gharabi and a leading figure in the 
Warriors’ Affairs Commission, Tripoli, November 2012. 
37  Two former leaders of the 17th of February Brigade, 
Mustafa Saqizli and Mohammed Shaiter, are now director 
and deputy director of the WAC. 
Islamist influence in the security apparatus extends 
far beyond the networks of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the LIFG. Numerous leaders of the Der’ Libya and 
the SSCs, particularly in the east and in Tripoli, can be 
identified with Islamist currents.38 Even where they do 
not belong to particular political organisations, many 
explicitly seek to use their influence in the security 
sector to create an Islamist state of some kind.39 
Extremist Groups 
A series of anti-Western attacks,40 as well as repeated 
incidents in which Sufi shrines were destroyed, point 
to the emergence of organised extremist groups fol-
lowing different radical Salafi currents. While they 
mostly operate outside the framework of the new 
official institutions, some of them can apparently 
count on support within them. The well-armed bri-
gades that have been destroying Sufi shrines largely 
in the west of the country evidently have good con-
nections in the Supreme Security Committees. SSC ele-
ments on several occasions sealed off the vicinity and 
allowed the extremists to operate with impunity.41 
 
38  The leadership of the Tripoli SSC is strongly dominated 
by Salafis – including its head, Hashem al-Bishr, and the com-
mander of its support units, Abderraouf al-Kara. The former 
head of the national SSC, Abdellatif Qaddour, also had a clear 
Salafi stance. Within the Der’ Libya, the units based in Ben-
ghazi comprise several former revolutionary brigades with 
an explicit Salafi outlook. 
39  Discussions with SSC leaders in Tripoli, as well as Ismail 
Sallabi, Mohammed al-Gharabi and other figures associated 
with the Rafallah Sahati brigade, Benghazi and Tripoli, June 
and November 2012, as well as March and April 2013. 
40  The series included attacks on the US liaison office in Ben-
ghazi, convoys of the British ambassador and the UN special 
envoy, and the offices of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross in Benghazi and Misrata. The most serious inci-
dents were the attack on the US liaison office in Benghazi on 
11 September 2012, in which the US ambassador was killed, 
as well as the car bomb that partially destroyed the French 
embassy in Tripoli on 23 April 2013. For an overview of in-
cidents until December 2012, see US Department of State, 
Accountability Review Board Report, 18 December 2012,  
15–16, www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf. 
41  Such as in the destruction of the al-Shaab mosque opposite 
the al-Mahari Radisson Hotel in central Tripoli in August 2012 
and the destruction of the tomb of Zubeida in Bani Walid 
in October 2012. Discussions with eye witnesses, Bani Walid, 
November 2012; “Magariaf Calls Destruction of Tombs Illegal, 
SSC Denies Any Participation in Shrine Destruction”, al-Watan 
al-Libiya, 25 August 2012, www.alwatan-libya.com/more.php? 
newsid=23695&catid=1. 
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The shrine destroyers represent a current loyal to 
the Saudi preacher Rabi’ al-Madkhali, who is highly 
influential among Salafis in the north-west. During 
the revolution, the Madkhalia groups remained 
neutral, and in some cases even openly supported the 
regime. After Gaddafi’s fall they were apparently able 
to draw on massive financial support of unknown 
provenance to establish an impressive arsenal.42 
The Salafi Jihadi spectrum, which – unlike the 
Madkhalia – played a significant part in the revolu-
tion, has also been able to organise. In June 2012, 
Salafi Jihadi brigades from across Libya held a heavily 
armed “forum for the victory of sharia” in central 
Benghazi.43 The rally would not have been possible 
without tacit acceptance by and – in the case of ele-
ments from the Der’ Libya – participation of leading 
brigades in the city, which are formally under defence 
ministry control. The Jihadi spectrum’s extremist 
fringe, which is responsible for carrying out attacks, is 
small but increasingly well-organised, and particularly 
strong in Darna. Dozens of fighters from Darna, and 
some members of Ansar al-Sharia from Benghazi, are 
known to have joined the struggle of Qaeda-linked 
groups in northern Mali against French forces.44 It 
remains unclear to what extent former LIFG members, 
some of whom are now in government, the GNC and 
the security apparatus, may be complicit in the activi-
ties of the radical Jihadi fringe. The milieu surround-
ing the former LIFG has fragmented into several cur-
rents, and as a whole should not be associated with 
violent extremism. Some of the more prominent LIFG 
figures have moved into the political mainstream, and 
display commitment to state institutions and civilian 
politics. Others, such as the leaders of Darna’s Abu 
Slim Martyrs brigade, use their military weight to 
exert pressure on civil institutions. The diverging 
 
42  Discussions with businesspeople from the Salafi milieu, 
Tripoli, November 2012; Sadeq al-Raqi’i, “Islamists in Libya: 
History and Jihad (3)”, al-Manara, 14 January 2012, tinyurl. 
com/b6btmkg. 
43  Groups that attended the forum included – among many 
others – the Abu Obeida Ibn al-Jarrah, Ansar al-Sharia and Abu 
Slim Martyrs brigades from Benghazi and Darna, elements 
of the Der’ Libya forces based in Benghazi, the Faruq brigade 
from Misrata, as well as a brigade from Sirte. Author’s obser-
vations, “Forum for the Victory of Sharia”, Benghazi, 7 June 
2012; “First Rally of Supporters of Sharia in Benghazi: 
Show of Strength by Armed Demonstrators, Fears of Libya 
Turning into Extremist State”, Quryna, 14 June 2012, www. 
qurynanew.com/36582. 
44  Discussions with Benghazi residents with direct knowl-
edge of the individuals involved, Benghazi, March 2013. 
paths taken by LIFG veterans go some way to explain-
ing why moderates have failed to prevent radical ele-
ments from resorting to violence. 
Local and Regional Forces: Local Councils, 
Tribes, Militias 
Apart from the Islamist movements, most political 
actors today identify and organise on a local or region-
al basis. The reasons for this lie in the trajectory of the 
civil war and the strength of local and tribal loyalties. 
In the early days of the revolution, local councils 
formed in the north-east, in the Nafusa Mountains 
and in Misrata, to protect the population and ensure 
supplies of vital necessities. Over the course of the 
conflict, small units created to defend communities 
against regime forces developed into a multitude of 
revolutionary brigades and military councils, all based 
at the local level. After the regime fell and its arms 
depots had been looted, the number of armed groups 
calling themselves revolutionary brigades proliferated, 
even in cities and regions (such as many parts of Tri-
poli) where there had been little fighting. Local mili-
tary councils formed almost everywhere. 
The local dynamics varied from region to region. 
Strong local structures emerged in the revolutionary 
centres of the north-west, closely linking civilian coun-
cils, tribal leaders and military units. In the north-
western region of Tripolitania the fall of the regime 
brought conflicts between revolutionary strongholds 
and tribes whose members had formed the backbone 
of Gaddafi’s security apparatus. Here, civilian/military 
structures arose even in cities that had taken the side 
of the regime or abstained from the struggle – to 
defend against attacks by revolutionary brigades. 
In the north-east, which had not been under mili-
tary threat since the start of the NATO intervention 
in March 2011, no local structures with comparable 
internal cohesion emerged, nor did conflicts flare 
between individual cities or tribes. Tensions arose 
principally between the revolutionary Islamist camp 
and members of the armed forces and security appa-
ratus. But local and regional interests still play an 
important role for political mobilisation in the region. 
These include demands for decentralisation and the 
movement for federalism and regional autonomy. 
The south (Fezzan) joined the revolution in its last 
month, largely without fighting. After the fall of the 
regime, serious conflicts erupted between newly 
formed tribal militias. These struggles have not yet 
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been overcome, and civilian and military councils 
in the south are often controlled by a single faction. 
Local groups define themselves above all in terms of 
ethnic or trial identity. 
In many places the councils remain an important 
forum for local politics and the main channel for 
representing local interests to the central government, 
although their influence has decreased since the end 
of the war – since they have (as of May 2013) no formal 
institutional basis and thus no regular budget.45 Their 
form of organisation and legitimacy varies from city 
to city. Only a handful of cities held local elections on 
their own initiative before the GNC in November 2012 
decided to postpone further elections until a local 
administration law has been adopted. 
Everywhere except the cities of the north-west the 
rise of local institutions increased the importance of 
tribal leaders. Councils of “wise men” (majalis hukama’), 
as both tribal leaders and respected urban community 
leaders are referred to, emerged in almost all cities 
during and after the revolution. But they did not 
appear from nowhere, as tribal leaders had been insti-
tutionally integrated under Gaddafi and not a few 
of the members of the new institutions had already 
served in similar functions under his regime.46 Moves 
to create a national body for the new councils led to 
two competing initiatives.47 Leaders of these national 
organisations and the local councils sought to mediate 
the conflicts that broke out in many places, but the 
success of these efforts was limited. Mostly the prob-
lem was the state’s inability to back agreements nego-
tiated by tribal leaders by deploying security forces 
and prosecuting crimes.48 
 
45  The local administration law passed by the Transitional 
Council in 2012 has yet to be implemented, because the 
Transitional Council preferred to leave this responsibility to 
the GNC and an elected government, but the GNC was long 
preoccupied with setting up a government. An attempt to 
pass the law with decisive amendments (governors and 
mayors to be appointed by the government rather than 
elected) was blocked in early 2013 by the GNC and the local 
councils. Besides organising local elections, implementing 
the law is likely to require further negotiations, as the gov-
ernment continues to insist that the local executive should 
be accountable to the central government, which will supply 
local budgets. 
46  Wolfram Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics”, in The 2011 
Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. 
Jason Pack (London, 2013) (in press). 
47  The Majlis Hukama Libya and the Ittihad Majalis al-Hukama 
wal-Shura. An attempt to create a joint structure at a confer-
ence in Tarhouna in November 2012 failed to achieve results. 
48  International Crisis Group (ICG), Divided We Stand: Libya’s 
Revolutionary Strongholds 
Cities that were strongholds of the revolutionary 
struggle have become local power centres in the post-
war phase. The political and military heavyweight in 
this respect is the north-western coastal city of Mis-
rata, where 40,000 members of revolutionary brigades 
are registered in a city of 300,000 residents.49 During 
the final months of the civil war Misrata’s brigades 
gained control over large parts of the army’s stocks 
of arms and munitions between Tripoli and Sirte. 
Months of fighting against regime forces created 
cohesive civilian and military institutions. In the 
immediate post-revolutionary period, the majority 
of Misrata’s revolutionary brigades stood under the 
control of the local military council and the Misratan 
Union of Revolutionaries, which cooperated closely 
with one another and with the local council.50 Despite 
a lack of clarity over its powers, the local council 
initially possessed broad legitimacy through elections 
that Misrata held on its own initiative in February 
2012. Since then, however, support for the local coun-
cil has declined and the Union and military council 
have lost much of their previous influence, as divi-
sions within the city’s political and business elite have 
come to the fore and the security situation has dete-
riorated.51 Nevertheless, the city’s representatives in 
the government and the GNC continue to push the 
interests of the revolutionary camp. Misratan leaders 
played a decisive role in establishing security insti-
tutions parallel to the old structures, in the form of 
the SSC and the Der’ Libya. Chief of Staff Youssef Man-
goush and Kib’s interior minister, Fawzi Abdel ‘Aal, 
under whom these units emerged, are both from Mis-
rata. The city dominates the Central Division of Der’ 
Libya, to which about seven thousand Misratis were 
recruited.52 The division’s offensive against Bani Walid 
in October 2012 therefore possessed a strong local 
dimension, with both sides reviving the memory of 
historical conflicts between Misrata and the Warfalla 
tribe of Bani Walid in the early twentieth century. The 
capture of the city underlined the military power of 
Misrata and its leading role in the revolutionary camp. 
Zintan in north-western Libya, whose leaders regard 
themselves as rivals of Misrata, takes second place. 
 
Enduring Conflicts (Brussels, 2012). 
49  Brian McQuinn, After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups, 
Small Arms Survey Working Paper 12 (Geneva, 2012), 13. 
50  Ibid., 20–21. 
51  Discussions, Misrata, April 2013. 
52  Brian McQuinn, After the Fall (see note 49), 12. 
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In contrast to urban Misrata, the strong internal co-
hesion that developed here has a tribal dimension, 
because Zintan is both tribe and city. Tribal leaders 
played a central role in political and military decision-
making, with their shura council becoming the highest 
instance, to which the local civilian and military coun-
cils deferred.53 
Like the revolutionaries of Misrata, the Zintan 
brigades also succeeded in gaining control over large 
stocks of weaponry.54 In summer 2012 Zintan’s bri-
gades launched several artillery attacks on nearby 
villages of the Mashashiya tribe to force its members 
to flee or to prevent their return.55 Some Libyan ob-
servers regarded the failure of these efforts as a sign 
of military weakness, and believe that the fighting 
decimated Zintan’s munitions stocks. 
Zintan’s reputation also suffered from its brigades’ 
notoriety for arbitrary arrests and other transgressions 
in Tripoli. Zintani ambitions to consolidate their in-
fluence via their representative in the Kib cabinet, 
Defence Minister Osama al-Juweili, remained unful-
filled. But while Juweili was largely sidelined by Chief 
of Staff Mangoush and Deputy Defence Minister 
Mabrouk,56 he still succeeded in turning a number 
of revolutionary brigades from Zintan into formal 
army units and entrusting them with important 
tasks.57 This reflected the aspirations of Zintan’s 
 
53  Discussions with members of the shura council and the 
local council, Zintan, November 2012; Lacher, “The Rise of 
Tribal Politics” (see note 46). 
54  As late as May 2012 brigades from Zintan seized twenty 
tanks and brought them to the city. “Military Source: Revolu-
tionaries Take Twenty Requisitioned Tanks to Zintan”, Quryna, 
28 May 2012, www.qurynanew.com/35512. 
55  Zintan accuses the Mashashiya of having fought on 
Gaddafi’s side and failed to hand over suspects accused of 
participating in crimes of the regime. The origins of the 
conflict between Zintan and the Mashashiya lie in disputes 
over land rights that already led to repeated skirmishes 
between the two tribes in the early twentieth century. These 
tensions grew under Gaddafi when the state gave the Masha-
shiya rights to land claimed by Zintan. “New Decision by 
al-Shgeiga: Zintan Leader Demands Handover of Suspects to 
State Prosecutor”, Quryna, 14 June 2012; “Several Thousand 
Displaced in Jebel Nafusa: ICRC Claim”, Libya Herald, 12 June 
2012; Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics” (see note 46). 
56  Juweili repeatedly expressed his frustration over this. 
See his undated memo on the situation in Bani Walid and 
“Defence Minister Juwaili Launches Scathing Attack on NTC”, 
Libya Herald, 27 June 2012. 
57  These include guarding the detained Gaddafi son Saif 
al-Islam in Zintan and controlling arms depots and large 
sections of the western border. Defence Ministry decrees 168, 
188 and 189/2012, Tripoli, 21 July and 2 August 2012. 
leaders to secure the city’s predominance over parts 
of south-western Libya. During the civil war a “mili-
tary council for the western region” composed largely 
of Zintanis was set up in the city and when the regime 
lost the Fezzan, brigades from Zintan recruited Tuareg 
and Toubou and took control of oil fields and border 
posts in the region. They remain present in strategic 
positions in the south-west. 
Local structures with closely interconnected civil-
ian and military leaderships also formed in other 
revolutionary strongholds, including Zawiya, the 
Souq al-Jum’a and Tajoura districts of Tripoli, and 
the Berber towns of the Nafusa Mountains. In all 
revolutionary cities, a political and military elite has 
emerged that claims to defend local interests. This 
revolutionary elite includes civilian brigade com-
manders as well as army officers who defected at the 
beginning of the revolution, like the leader of the 
Misratan Union of Revolutionaries, Colonel Salem 
Jouha, and the leader of the “military council for the 
western region”, Colonel Mokhtar Fernana. In Misrata, 
a port city with a well-established commercial elite, 
representatives of prominent families play an im-
portant role. Members of the Swehli, Fortia, al-Dhar-
rat, Beit al-Mal and other leading families funded the 
revolutionary struggle during the early months and 
operated as the city’s political representatives. Tripoli 
business networks played a similarly important role in 
funding the brigades that seized control of the capital. 
In the Nafusa Mountains tribal leaders were crucial, 
while in Zawiya and Tripoli representatives of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi currents gained prom-
inence. The elites of the revolution thus owe their own 
advancement to their contribution to the struggle, 
their wealth, their traditional reputation, or a com-
bination of these factors. Their present influence is 
closely tied to the military might of their cities and 
brigades. 
Losers of the Revolution 
The losers of the revolution can also be defined in 
local or tribal categories. This is because Gaddafi’s 
security apparatus was largely recruited from par-
ticular tribes, first and foremost Gaddafi’s own tribe, 
the Gaddadfa around Sirte and Sabha, the Warfalla, 
whose stronghold is Bani Walid, and the Magarha 
from the al-Shate’ region in the Fezzan. Numerous 
other groups were regarded as loyal to the regime, 
including several smaller tribes around the Nafusa 
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Mountains and in the north-western coastal plain 
and the (expelled) residents of Tawergha, who were 
descended from slaves from sub-Saharan Africa. 
All these groups now share the fate of political 
marginalisation and stigmatisation as regime loyal-
ists. Many of their members are accused of participa-
tion in crimes of the regime and held in prisons over 
which the Libyan courts often possess only nominal 
control. Some of their cities were looted and ran-
sacked by revolutionary brigades, including Sirte and 
Bani Walid. In certain cases whole groups were driven 
out, most notoriously in the offensive by Misratan 
brigades against Tawergha. The latter remains a ghost 
town to this day, with the brigades preventing resi-
dents from returning. 
Exclusion and attacks by revolutionary forces have 
led some of these groups to organise at local or tribal 
level. In Bani Walid, militias including former mem-
bers of Gaddafi’s brigades drove the revolutionary 
local council and a revolutionary brigade out of the 
city in January 2012 and took control. A social council 
of tribal leaders formed, whose declarations made no 
mention of the revolution and the Transitional Coun-
cil. This civilian/military coalition prevented any 
attempt by revolutionary brigades to enter the city, 
and took brigade members from Misrata, Zliten and 
Tripoli hostage to exchange for members of the War-
falla held in those cities.58 When one of the hostages 
died shortly after release this led to the aforemen-
tioned “Decision No. 7” of the GNC and the siege and 
capture of Bani Walid. The members of the social 
council and the militias fled temporarily, but sub-
sequently returned to gradually force out revolution-
ary forces, which were unable to retain control of the 
town. By March 2013, the social council was back in 
charge, and anger in the town grew after the discovery 
of the bodies of twenty-one people who Bani Walid 
residents said had died under torture in Misratan 
prisons. 
Resistance to revolutionary forces occurred in 
al-Shate’ too. The death of a child in an operation by 
the Supreme Security Committee led to days of fight-
ing between the local population and SSC forces. As in 
the case of Bani Walid, the revolutionary camp sought 
to defame its opponents as regime loyalists. The situ-
ation only calmed down when the SSC forces were 
withdrawn and replaced with an army unit accepted 
as neutral. 
 
58  Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics” (see note 46). 
Certain cities on the losing side failed to develop 
cohesive local structures; instead internal conflicts 
broke out. In Sirte and Tarhouna, the situation is char-
acterised by tensions within local tribes between the 
revolutionary camp and members of the old security 
apparatus. That antagonism forms the backdrop to 
killings in both cities.59 
Beyond such local solidarity there are also efforts 
to unite groups that see themselves as losers of the 
uprising in resistance against the revolutionary camp. 
Until the capture of Bani Walid in October 2012, such 
efforts were led by the Warfalla, who organised several 
meetings of tribal leaders from these groups in the 
city. The forums issued declarations appealing to 
the historic ties uniting the tribes and calling for a 
national amnesty, the release of the wrongly impris-
oned and an end to the marginalisation of particular 
tribes.60 But none of these groups intervened in soli-
darity during the siege and capture of Bani Walid. 
Federalists and Ethnic Minorities 
The upsurge of local structures and loyalties also 
includes initiatives for regional self-administration 
and growing demands from ethnic minorities. One 
manifestation of such tendencies is the federalist 
movement, rooted above all in eastern Cyrenaica 
(Arabic: Barqa), which feeds on resentment over the 
region’s political and economic marginalisation under 
Gaddafi and nostalgic memories of its leading role 
during the monarchy of the 1950s and 1960s.61 But an 
attempt to form a regional council in March 2012 and 
 
59  “Foreign NGOs Ordered Out of Sirte”, Libya Herald, 11 June 
2012; “Assassination Attempt on Commander of Qardhabiya 
Brigade”, al-Tadhamon, 2 October 2012, www.irassa.com/ 
modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=3019; “Tarhouna’s 
Security Forces Detain Suspects over al-Kani Murder”, 
al-Tadhamon, 6 November 2012, www.libya-alyoum.com/news/ 
index.php?id=21&textid=12437; “Former Tarhouna NTC Rep-
resentative Tortured and Killed”, in: Libya Herald, 7 November 
2012; “Local Council Member Murdered in Sirte”, Quryna, 13 
November 2012, www.qurynanew.com/44812. 
60  Final Declaration, First Forum of the Social Forces of Libya, Bani 
Walid, 21 May 2012; Final Declaration, Second Forum of the Social 
Forces of Libya, Bani Walid, 7 June 2012. 
61  Libya’s first constitution of 1951 created a federal system 
with the regions Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. After oil 
production began, federal structures were dissolved in 1963 
and the role of central government strengthened. The tribal 
elites of the Cyrenaica, which were closely allied with the 
royal Sanusi family, played a leading political role and domi-
nated the armed forces. 
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declare the region autonomous revealed that the fed-
eralists lack broad support in the region. Cyrenaica’s 
local councils, its most powerful revolutionary bri-
gades and the Muslim Brotherhood (which is strong 
in Cyrenaica) rejected the unilateral move by the 
Barqa Council.62 The latter’s call for an election boycott 
failed, and attempts at violent disruption of the July 
2012 vote by autonomy supporters further discredited 
the movement. Tactical disagreements and political 
rivalries ultimately ensured that it fragmented into 
various parties and structures.63 
The federalist movement in Cyrenaica draws its 
support from three main constituencies. Some of its 
leaders are intellectuals from Benghazi and Darna, 
mostly former members of the exile opposition. A 
much larger role is played by the establishment of 
certain tribes, especially the Obeidat, Awaqir and 
Magharba, although by no means all their leaders 
back the movement.64 Parts of the region’s officer 
class, who are often closely related to the tribal 
leaders, form the third group. The Barqa Military 
Council, an organisation of army officers, can be 
regarded as the federalists’ armed wing. Military 
support for the movement is stoked by frustration 
over local officers’ marginalisation in the security 
sector, which is dominated by units from revolu-
tionary brigades. 
In Benghazi, the political and economic centre of 
Cyrenaica, there are widespread demands to decen-
tralise the country’s political system and move minis-
tries and state-owned businesses to the city. But these 
ideas should not be equated with those of the federal-
ists; many of those calling for the relocation of state-
owned businesses explicitly reject any association 
with the federalists and repudiate their attempts 
to instrumentalise the much broader base of the 
 
62  Wolfram Lacher, “Is Autonomy for Northeastern Libya 
Realistic?” Sada, 21 March 2012, carnegieendowment.org/ 
sada/2012/03/21/is-autonomy-for-northeastern-libya-realistic/ 
a431. 
63  Apart from the Barqa council these include the Party of 
National Union, the Federalist Alliance and the Barqa Youth 
Movement. Discussion with Mohammed Buisir, federalist 
activist, Benghazi, November 2012; “The National Union, 
Libya’s First Federalist Party”, al-Jazeera.net, 23 November 
2012, www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/4b438793-e334-48da-
81b5-9af26a4a6068. 
64  Discussion with Mohammed Idris al-Maghrabi, president 
of Majlis Hukama’ Libya and leader of the Magharba, Benghazi, 
November 2012. 
decentralisation movement for the federalist cause.65 
The federalist agenda is regarded with suspicion 
nationally. Many suspect the federalists of intending 
to lay claim to control of the oil produced in Cyre-
naica. And indeed, a lively debate is taking place 
within the movement about how oil revenues would 
be shared between the national and regional levels in 
a federal system.66 
In other regions, federalism enjoys even less sup-
port. While cautious attempts to spread the federal 
idea can be observed in the south too, local observers 
attribute these above all to the attempts – regarded as 
futile – of the Saif al-Nasr clan to restore its historic 
predominance in the Fezzan.67 In Tripolitania, where 
numerous local power centres compete, there is no 
political basis for a regional entity. A separate region 
for the Amazigh (Berbers) is inconceivable, as the area 
around the Nafusa Mountains and the coastal city of 
Zuwara is too interspersed with centres of Arab popu-
lation such as Zintan or Rujban. The same applies to 
the Toubou in the far south and the Tuareg in the ex-
treme south-west, even if certain leaders of the latter 
are certainly open to federal ideas.68 
Ethnic minority interests are consequently only 
partly compatible with federalism. Minority activists 
call above all for an end to political discrimination, 
to which they still feel exposed in the new Libya. 
Representatives of the Tuareg, for example, point 
towards decisions of the Integrity Commission that 
exclude all of their four deputies from the GNC. 
Amazigh and Toubou activists cite their groups’ weak 
 
65  Discussions with economic decentralisation activists, 
Benghazi, March 2013. 
66  Discussion with Mohammed Buisir, Benghazi, November 
2012. 
67  The Saif al-Nasr family has occupied a leading position 
in the Awlad Suleiman tribe since the eighteenth century. In 
the nineteenth century they gained temporary control of the 
Fezzan, against opposition from the Ottoman governor in 
Tripoli. Members of the family served as governors of the 
Fezzan from 1951 to 1969. Abdelmajid Saif al-Nasr, son of the 
last governor, joined the NTCin March 2011 and later headed 
the Supreme Security Committee in Tripoli. Another mem-
ber of the family, Abdeljalil Saif al-Nasr, is GNCmember for 
Sabha. Demands for federalism voiced at occasional demon-
strations in Sabha are seen locally as driven by the Saif 
al-Nasr clan. Abdelmajid Saif al-Nasr also canvassed Tuareg 
leaders for support for federalism. Discussions with Tuareg 
leaders, Tripoli, June and November 2012; “Marginalisation 
Spurs Calls for Federalism in Sabha”, al-Tadhamon, 7 Novem-
ber 2012, tinyurl.com/ajyx4oj. 
68  Discussions with Tuareg leaders, Tripoli, June and Novem-
ber 2012. 
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representation in government and the GNC, and the 
Toubou complain that their neighbourhoods in Kufra 
are sealed off by militias of the Arab Zuwayya tribe. 
Because the citizenship of many Toubou is contested, 
their adversaries in Kufra and Sabha find it easy to 
present Toubou brigades as “Chadian mercenaries”, 
and this interpretation is adopted uncritically by 
many in the Libyan political elite. Questions of citizen-
ship are therefore a central concern for the Toubou.69 
To a lesser extent this also applies to the Tuareg, since 
the naturalisation of members from Mali and Niger 
under Gaddafi blurred the lines between Libyan and 
non-Libyan Tuareg.70 Finally, all three minorities 
demand official recognition and promotion of their 
languages. 
Minority representatives differ widely over how far 
their demands should go. Toubou representation – 
organised in the National Toubou Assembly – appears 
to be the most cohesive, with close ties between polit-
ical leaders and ethnically dominated military units. 
Among both the Tuareg and the Amazigh, rival orga-
nisations have emerged. 
Demands for federalism and minority rights are 
likely to be some of the most controversial questions 
in the constitutional process. While decentralisation 
to the local level might take the wind out of the sails 
of the federalist movement, ethnic minorities’ de-
mands could encounter tough resistance, especially 
from local rivals but also from Islamist currents and 
chauvinist representatives of the big cities. 
 
69  The Toubou live in southern Libya and northern Chad 
and Niger. Only some of the Toubou living in Libya were 
registered in the 1954 census. In the 1970s Gaddafi granted 
more than thirty thousand Toubou in the Chadian Aouzou 
Strip Libyan citizenship, but took it away again in the 1990s. 
A regime campaign begun in 2007 to strip many Toubou in 
Kufra of their citizenship led to fighting in the city in 2008. 
The chaos of the revolution created opportunities to issue 
false documents. Discussions with Toubou leaders, June 2012; 
Peter Cole, Borderline Chaos? Stabilizing Libya’s Periphery, Carne-
gie Paper, October 2012. 
70  From the 1980s Gaddafi granted Libyan citizenship to 
several thousand Tuareg from Mali and Niger who served in 
the Islamic Legion and other units. While many of them left 
Libya during the final months of the civil war, around three 
thousand are estimated to remain in brigades in Ubari and 
Ghat that are officially under defense ministry control. Dis-
cussions with Tuareg leaders, Tripoli, June and November 
2012 and April 2013. 
The Revolutionary Camp and Its Opponents 
The revolutionary camp is a conglomeration of dis-
parate actors as yet representing no national political 
force. Few of the leaders and members of brigades 
claiming the label thuwar (revolutionaries) have thus 
far switched to civilian politics, and their representa-
tion in the GNC is weak. Many are remaining in the 
new military and security institutions, seeking future 
influence in the security sector, or waiting to draw 
advantage from future demobilisation or integration 
in civilian posts. But it is conceivable that these actors 
will increasingly percolate into politics, causing 
further changes in the political landscape. 
What the revolutionaries agree on is that supposed 
Gaddafi loyalists (azlam al-nidham, supporters of the 
regime) should be excluded from public office and the 
uprising’s protagonists play a major role in the new 
state. Thus their demands for positions in government 
and the security services, or for financial and material 
benefits. But as soon as the distribution of posts or 
benefits becomes an issue, each revolutionary faction 
pursues its own interests. One example were the vio-
lent attacks on government officials by revolutionaries 
demanding salaries or medical treatment abroad.71 
The general reputation of the revolutionaries has 
plummeted because of such actions, and there has 
been discussion of “pseudo-revolutionaries” and even 
comparisons with Gaddafi’s revolutionary commit-
tees. 
So far all attempts to create a joint representation 
of revolutionary interests have failed.72 Numerous 
organisations claiming to represent Libya’s revolu-
tionaries have been founded, but these are mostly 
 
71  Or the demand raised by the Union of Revolutionary 
Brigades in the run-up to the elections, that revolutionaries 
should be guaranteed a certain number of seats in the 
National Congress. “Attack on Prime Minister’s Office after 
Suspension of Payments to Revolutionaries”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 
10 April 2012, alwatan-libya.com/more.php?newsid=21251& 
catid=1; “Protest by Union of Revolutionary Brigades at Tran-
sitional Council: Council Accepts Most Demands”, al-Watan 
al-Libiya, 1 May 2012, tinyurl.com/cjgsd29; “One Dead in 
Attack on Government Buildings in Tripoli: Supreme Security 
Committee Condemns Incident”, Quryna, 8 May 2012, www. 
qurynanew.com/34286. 
72  The first attempt was the founding of a Libyan Union of 
Revolutionary Brigades (Ittihad Saraya Thuwar Libya) in Misrata 
on 22 September 2011, in which Fawzi Bukatef (see page 15), 
Abdel Hakim Belhadj (page 11) and Salem Jouha (page 19) par-
ticipated. The initiative came to nothing and the name Ittihad 
Saraya al-Thuwar has since been used exclusively by Bukatef 
for his coalition of brigades from Benghazi. 
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composed of brigades from particular cities or dis-
tricts.73 While the cabinet was being formed, various 
revolutionary groups stormed the GNC three times to 
protest for different reasons against its composition. 
Zeidan concluded that it was almost impossible to 
take account of the revolutionaries’ demands as long 
as they had no unified representation, saying that he 
had met with thirty-two groups each claiming to 
represent the revolutionaries of all Libya.74 Since April 
2012 certain leaders have worked tenaciously to form 
a Supreme Council of Libyan Revolutionaries as a 
national platform, but its activities have not moved 
beyond a series of conferences with different partici-
pants, at which the council has been repeatedly 
founded anew without agreement on its actual com-
position.75 
Such disagreements, however, have not prevented 
revolutionary leaders from demanding Zeidan’s dis-
missal in the name of the Supreme Council – in words 
that reflected growing antagonism between the gov-
ernment and those considering themselves as the 
‘real revolutionaries’.76 Despite the fact that the gov-
ernment includes a number of former revolutionary 
leaders, many thuwar view the government as a whole 
as hostile towards their interests. This is largely due 
to the strong commitment voiced by Zeidan and the 
defence, interior and justice ministers to dismantle 
armed groups, integrate parallel forces into a new 
 
73  Such as the Alliance of Libyan Revolutionaries (Tajammu’ 
Thuwar Libya) founded by Abdel Majid Mlegta (see page 10) in 
October 2011, which was dominated by Zintanis. 
74  Zeidan says he consulted the leaders of various mostly 
Islamist-leaning brigades. According to Mohammed al-Gha-
rabi of the Rafallah Sahati Brigade, revolutionaries from 
various cities agreed on a candidate for the post of defence 
minister, but Zeidan ignored this. Press conference of Ali 
Zeidan, Tripoli, 1 November 2012; discussion with Moham-
med al-Gharabi, Tripoli, November 2012. 
75  “Eleven Recommendations in the Announcement of the 
Formation of the Supreme Council of Libyan Revolution-
aries”, al-Manara, 5 April 2012, tinyurl.com/d82ymba; “Offi-
cial Announcement of Supreme Council of Revolutionaries”, 
Quryna, 29 July 2012, www.qurynanew.com/39268; “An-
nouncement of Founding of Supreme Council of Revolu-
tionaries in Tripoli”, al-Manara, 12 August 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
c7yfq7v; “Libyan Parliament Stormed: Rift in Revolutionary 
Ranks over Zeidan Cabinet”, al-Hayat, 2 November 2012, 
alhayat.com/Details/449384; “Revolutionaries Hold Sixth 
Conference in Misrata to Discuss Organisational Structure 
of Supreme Council of Revolutionaries”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 
10 December 2012, tinyurl.com/a3z3yyf. 
76  “Declaration of the Supreme Council of Libyan Revolu-
tionaries”, 19 March 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
To1G3lRLAL4 
security sector, and bring prisons under state control. 
In the first half of 2013, growing tensions between 
revolutionary forces and the government surfaced 
in incidents such as the abduction of an adviser to 
Zeidan and repeated sieges on ministries by armed 
groups.77 
But the revolutionary camp comprises a much 
broader group of actors than just the revolutionary 
brigades. A large part of the Islamist currents can be 
attributed to it, along with the representatives of 
revolutionary strongholds. They all use the language 
of the revolution to legitimise demands for influence, 
and to score points against political adversaries. Even 
if many politicians in the revolutionary camp con-
demn the tactics used by armed thuwar to exert in-
fluence, some exploit – or even encourage – their 
moves against government institutions to their polit-
ical advantage. Their combined pressure forced many 
of Gaddafi-era officials and diplomats who had played 
an important role in the early days of the revolution 
out of the political arena. 
Opposing the revolutionary camp is an even more 
heterogeneous collection of moderate, conservative 
and counter-revolutionary forces. They include those 
parts of the elites that had come to terms with the 
regime, or failed to invest heavily in the revolution. 
Many deputies of the National Forces Alliance fall into 
this category, along with numerous independents in 
the GNC. So do tribal leaders working for local and 
national reconciliation, including both figures who 
served under Gaddafi and others who are untainted in 
this respect. Large parts of the officer class within the 
police and military fear being driven out by the revo-
lutionaries. Many members of tribes regarded as sup-
porters of the former regime also feel threatened or 
vanquished by the revolutionary camp. 
Finally, a large group that is virtually excluded 
from politics in the new Libya is that part of the popu-
lation – composed primarily of members of these 
same tribes – that fled to neighbouring Tunisia and 
Egypt during or after the regime’s demise to escape 
detention or vengeance. There are no reliable figures 
for this group, though estimates in mid-2012 put their 
number at 1 to 1.2 million Libyans, or about one sixth 
of the population. Even if the real number may be 
only half that figure, it would still be a significant 
 
77  “Justice Ministry Seized by SSC; Minister and Staff Eject-
ed”, Libya Herald, 31 March 2013; “Libya PM’s Aide Mohamed 
al-Ghattous Freed by Kidnappers”, BBC News, 9 April 2013; 
“Gunmen Surround Libyan Foreign Ministry to Push De-
mands”, Reuters, 28 April 2013. 
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constituency.78 The NTC deliberately excluded them 
from the elections to the National Congress.79 An 
attempt by the Islamic scholar Ali Sallabi to mediate 
with their representatives was broken off amidst 
angry protests from the revolutionary camp.80 
The rifts between the opposing camps have deep-
ened since the end of the civil war. Individual ini-
tiatives by prominent actors like GNC president 
Mohamed Magariaf to extend a hand to the losers 
provoked a storm of protest from the revolutionaries, 
making such moves politically risky.81 The tensions 
and dynamics between the two camps are not alone 
responsible for the present conflicts, but they are 
central to the success of the transitional process and 
the country’s medium-term stability. 
 
 
 
78  Libyan officials and Egyptian diplomats estimated in mid-
2012 that there were 400,000 to 500,000 Libyans in Tunisia 
and 500,000 to 700,000 in Egypt. There are no official figures 
from the Egyptian or Tunisian side. Discussion with Ali 
Sallabi, Tripoli, June 2012; discussion with Egyptian diplo-
mats, Cairo, October 2012; “Libyan Ambassador in Tunis: 
Majority of more than 500,000 Libyans in Tunisia Are Fugi-
tives from Libyan Justice”, al-Manara, 8 June 2012, tinyurl. 
com/bf55xuh. 
79  While Libyans in Washington, Ottawa, London, Berlin, 
Abu Dhabi and Amman were able to vote, this option was not 
available to the much larger numbers of Libyan citizens in 
Egypt and Tunisia. Members of the electoral commission 
argued unconvincingly that it was easy for Libyans in neigh-
bouring countries to come home to vote. 
80  “Sallabi: Meeting with Members of Former Regime Oc-
curred at Request of Abdeljalil in Framework of National 
Reconciliation”, al-Tadhamon, 1 June 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
bxxzzzz. 
81  Magariaf travelled to Bani Walid to mediate in September 
2012, and obtained the release of three hostages held there. 
In November 2012 he visited Shgeiga to attend the integra-
tion of a local Mashashiya unit into the Der’ Libya. The visit 
led to protests by Zintanis, who said that the unit contained 
former members of Gaddafi’s brigades. “Magariaf Meets Dele-
gation from Zintan Protesting Visit to Shgeiga”, Quryna, 11 
November 2012, www.qurynanew.com/44749. 
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Areas and Dynamics of Conflict 
 
There is a direct connection between the emergence 
of new political forces since the beginning of the revo-
lution and the conflicts that have developed in numer-
ous regions and policy areas. Sometimes these are 
armed confrontations, sometimes latent tensions 
whose future trajectory is unclear. Many of these con-
flicts are rooted in the fault lines of the revolution 
between individual tribes and cities, or are connected 
in other ways with the Gaddafi era. Questions of jus-
tice for crimes committed before, during and after the 
civil war are particularly important. The army and 
security forces, which are indispensable to contain 
such conflicts, are themselves the object of sometimes 
violent power struggles. The economy is becoming 
another important field of conflict. 
The Balance of Power between Local and 
Regional Actors 
The interest groups that have formed at the local and 
tribal level inevitably find themselves in competition 
with one another. Many protagonists see the civil war 
and the negotiation of the post-war order as a zero-
sum game between individual cities and tribes. 
According to Mahmoud Shammam, a long-serving 
member of the exiled opposition who became Mah-
moud Jibril’s information minister, the victorious 
cities will write the constitution and the defeated will 
have to accept the new order.82 The fall of the regime 
destroyed networks in government, business and the 
military that were based largely on particular cities 
and tribes. New locally rooted networks now seek to 
take over. Much of the tension over appointments to 
positions in government and the public sector should 
be understood in this context. 
Many armed conflicts reflect struggles between 
local power centres: the capture of Bani Walid under 
the leadership of brigades from Misrata, or attacks 
by brigades from Zintan, Zawiya or Zuwara on cities 
regarded as loyal to Gaddafi. In all these cases the 
 
82  “To Mr Mahmoud Shammam: Why Are You Dividing 
the People into Victors and Vanquished?”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 
27 May 2012, tinyurl.com/al9o856. 
conflicts are tied up with questions of justice, espe-
cially the surrender of prisoners and suspects. But 
the ensuing military operations were always also a 
demonstration of power by revolutionary strong-
holds.83 
Rivalries between local actors have not only devel-
oped along the fault lines of the civil war. The con-
flicts between armed groups of the Toubou ethnic 
group and Arab tribes in Sabha and Kufra stem mainly 
from competition over the redistribution of resources, 
above all profits from the thriving smuggling busi-
ness. Given widespread and persistent conflict, there 
is little willingness among local groups to surrender 
their arms. Behind the façade of official units under 
the authority of the defence and interior ministries, 
local structures – and therefore the potential for 
violent confrontation – persist. At the same time, the 
strongly local dimension of these conflicts has tended 
to thwart any broader escalation. 
State-building and the constitutional process will 
also create areas of conflict between local actors. In 
the constitutional process, local power centres share 
an interest in maximising the competencies of local 
administration. Much greater potential for conflict 
emanates from the distribution of power between cities 
and regions. By late 2012 certain local councils had 
already begun working to redraw administrative 
boundaries in their own specific interests.84 Smaller 
towns fear coming under the dominance of larger 
neighbours with which they are often in conflict, as 
is the case with Riqdalein and Zuwara, al-Ajeilat and 
Sabratha, or Mizda and Zintan. For Toubou, Tuareg 
and Berber, the way new boundaries are drawn will 
decide whether they dominate the new administrative 
units in their regions or remain a minority. Federalists 
seek to create regional units. In all these cases, much 
 
83  On Zintan see note 55; on Zawiya and Zuwara: “Efforts 
for Reconciliation Between Fighters from Zawiya and War-
shafana”, Quryna, 14 November 2011, www.qurynanew.com/ 
20066; “Crisis Meeting on Zuwara’s Conflicts with Riqdalein 
and al-Jumail”, Quryna, 4 April 2012, www.qurynanew.com/ 
32527. 
84  “Sabratha Proposes Creation of Own Province Including 
Neighbouring Regions”, al-Tadhamon, 29 November 2012, 
tinyurl.com/axmeyy3. 
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is at stake because the decentralisation would devolve 
some control over state spending to the sub-national 
level. The implementation of a decentralised adminis-
trative system, as proposed in the NTC’s 2012 local 
administration law, has been blocked by disputes over 
whether the local executive should be accountable to 
the central government for its spending, or to munic-
ipal councils. Moreover, because of the sensitivities 
involved in drawing provincial boundaries, the gov-
ernment and GNC have decided to defer the introduc-
tion of governorates. Even so, defining and delineating 
municipalities will be a protracted process. Beyond 
the tug-of-war over the local administration law, these 
issues are also likely to be among the most important 
bones of contention in the constitutional process. 
Power struggles over distribution of state resources 
are unlikely to end with the establishment of a new 
administrative system. Cities and tribes will continue 
to compete over the allocation of government expen-
diture. Since the fall of the regime, a pattern of violent 
protests to assert local interests has emerged. Whether 
their demands relate to the relocation of state-owned 
enterprises or investments in infrastructure, local 
actors are likely to make use of their new-found in-
fluence and ensure that the central government 
remains under permanent pressure. 
Power Struggles in the Security Sector 
Power struggles have developed over control of the 
security sector. They concern the distribution of posts 
and budgets as well as more far-reaching political 
objectives of actors in the security sector. Tensions are 
strongest between the Gaddafi-era institutions and 
officer class and the new units established by revo-
lutionaries. As the government moves ahead with its 
efforts to integrate the new units, such tensions may 
escalate. 
A wide variety of forces has appeared in the security 
sector since the fall of the regime. Revolutionary lead-
ers initially founded the Supreme Security Committee 
to stabilise Tripoli after the war.85 A central SSC was 
created in the Interior Ministry at the end of 2011, and 
local branches established throughout Libya during 
the first half of 2012. With the incentive of compara-
tively high salaries, the SSCs succeeded in integrating 
 
85  The core of SSC Tripoli was formed by brigades from two 
revolutionary strongholds, the districts of Souq al-Jum’a and 
Tajoura. 
a large number of armed groups and individuals. As 
a consequence, the number of so-called “revolution-
aries” increased exponentially. The composition of the 
SSCs differed from one city or unit to another. While 
some of the groups that joined the SSCs were revo-
lutionary brigades, many more were militias that 
emerged after the fall of the regime. In towns such 
as Sabratha, a large part of the police force joined the 
SSC. Generally speaking, however, the interior minis-
try’s control over the SSCs was weak to non-existent; 
in many cases, the internal command structures of 
the armed groups under the SSC’s umbrella remained 
largely unaffected by their integration.86 In December 
2012 there were 26,000 men on the payroll of the SSC 
Tripoli alone; the national figure was estimated at 
131,000 men in July 2012.87 Local SSCs have mostly 
acted as a police force, but often with an explicitly 
political mandate to arrest alleged former regime 
elements. Units reporting directly to the central SSC 
have at times conducted military operations against 
such supposed remnants of the regime. 
In parallel to the SSCs, regional coalitions of revolu-
tionary brigades emerged at the beginning of 2012 
to form Der’ Libya. The initiative originated from local 
military councils and brigades in the north-east, the 
centre and the west of the country.88 Only after they 
had been set up did the new formations receive a 
unified name from the Defence Ministry and formal 
recognition as security forces under the chief of staff. 
The first three Der’ Libya divisions in the west, east and 
 
86  ICG, Divided We Stand (see note 48), 12–15. 
87  “Supreme Security Committee to Be Dissolved by End 
of Year, Says Tripoli Chief”, Libya Herald, 17 October 2012; 
“SSC Demise by 31 December Reconfirmed by Hashim 
Bishar”, Libya Herald, 9 December 2012. 
88  In the northwest a joint unit formed by the military coun-
cils of Zintan, Zawiya, Zuwara, Surman and Jadu in January 
2012 did not appear as the Western Division of Der’ Libya until 
March 2012. A coalition of brigades from Benghazi that inter-
vened in the conflict between Toubou and Zuwayya in Kufra 
in mid-February 2012 was renamed an official Der’ Libya unit 
of the Defence Ministry on 24 February. The military councils 
of Misrata, Zliten, Mesallata, al-Khoms, Sirte and Bani Walid 
formed a joint unit in Misrata at the end of February 2012, 
which later became the Central Division of Der’ Libya. “An-
nouncement of Formation of Brigade of 1,500 Fighters to Pro-
tect Western Region”, al-Manara, 23 January 2012, tinyurl. 
com/arf2kct; “Formation of Military Division of 7,000 Revolu-
tionaries in Libya”, al-Manara, 28 February 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
a4q95tx; “Group from Coalition of Revolutionary Brigades 
in Eastern Region Turns to Kufra”, al-Tadhamon, 14 February 
2012, presssolidarity.net/archive/index.php?page=main& 
news_item=1985. 
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centre were joined by others in the course of the 
year;89 by January 2013, these forces comprised 13,000 
men. Again, the internal structures of the participat-
ing brigades remained largely intact, and individual 
Der’ Libya divisions operated in quite different ways. 
The Eastern Division intervened one-sidedly in the 
conflict between Toubou and Zuwayya in Kufra, 
and was ultimately replaced by other brigades from 
Benghazi after pressure from the Toubou, while the 
Central Division dominated by Misrata operated as a 
neutral force in the conflict between Toubou and the 
Awlad Suleiman tribe in Sabha, but later mounted 
the retribution campaign against Bani Walid de-
scribed above. Nonetheless, the chief of staff generally 
entrusted Der’ Libya – and not the remnants of the 
regular army – with restoring stability. 
Another structure composed of revolutionary bri-
gades arose in the form of the border guards and the 
“National Guard”. Exercising control over these units 
presents a similar challenge for the government. Then 
Deputy Defence Minister Siddiq Mabrouk long refused 
to place the border forces he controlled under the 
authority of the chief of staff. After Defence Minister 
Mohammed al-Barghathi attempted to push through 
the change, Mabrouk’s men clashed with the minis-
ter’s convoy at Tobruk air base in January 2013. 
According to al-Barghathi, this was an assassination 
attempt instigated by his deputy, who was immediate-
ly dismissed.90 
Besides groups under the umbrella of the SSC or the 
Der’ Libya, former revolutionaries and other civilians 
have also created numerous other forces that operate 
with official authorisation from the defence ministry, 
or have been turned into formal army units. There are 
no reliable figures for this patchwork of units and 
their members. Although 215,000 individuals regis-
tered with the Warriors’ Affairs Commission, of which 
140,000 were recognised as revolutionaries, by no 
means all members of the SSCs, the Der’ Libya, or other 
forces are on the WAC’s lists.91 
 
89  Including the fifth division of Der’ Libya in Tripoli; the 
Rafallah Sahati Brigade (see note 36) became the seventh 
division. “Mangoush: New Army will Be Small with Precisely 
Defined Role”, al-Tadhamon, 4 January 2013, tinyurl.com/ 
af4897u. 
90  “Declaration of the Defence Minister”, Office of the Prime 
Minister, Tripoli, 19 January 2013. 
91  “LD 500 Million Project Being Prepared by Warriors 
Affairs Commission to Get Revolutionaries Ready for Busi-
ness”, Libya Herald, 17 December 2012; discussions with lead-
ing SSC figures and leaders of former revolutionary brigades, 
Tripoli, April 2013. 
On the other side are the fragments of the old 
military and security apparatus. In parts of the army, 
irregular local structures have developed similar to 
those of the revolutionary brigades. Army units in the 
north-east that switched sides at the beginning of 
the revolution were initially commanded by General 
Abdel Fattah Younes. After his assassination at the end 
of July 2011 and the subsequent fall of the regime, 
the remnants of the armed forces were left without 
a national structure. Regional coalitions of officers 
began reorganising the army on their own initiative 
and competing for the post of chief of staff.92 In the 
east, a group of officers formed the Barqa Military 
Council. After Youssef Mangoush was appointed chief 
of staff in January 2012, units composed of revolu-
tionary brigades like Der’ Libya were given leading 
functions while regular forces felt increasingly mar-
ginalised.93 In this context, units like the 1st Infantry 
Division in Benghazi increasingly pursued their own 
interests. In the revolutionary strongholds of the west, 
deserting officers played a crucial role in local military 
councils, and many continue to operate outside for-
mal military command structures. Elsewhere, mem-
bers of Gaddafi’s brigades who escaped capture joined 
with pro-revolutionary officers and civilians to form 
new units on a local basis.94 The distinction between 
regular and irregular forces has become increasingly 
blurred. This fragmentation is only gradually being 
reversed: in the Tripoli area, several officers who 
led revolutionary brigades have returned to senior 
positions in the army and defence ministry, and 
army units across the country are churning out new 
recruits.95 
The revolutionary leaders in charge of the new in-
stitutions share a clear political objective: the removal 
 
92  “Libyan Armed Forces Reorganisation: Controversy over 
Haftar’s Appointment as Chief of Staff”, Quryna, 21 November 
2011, www.qurynanew.com/20974; “Sabha Military Council 
Debates Reforming Libyan Army”, Quryna, 16 November 2011, 
www.qurynanew.com/20383; “General Mahmoud Declares 
Support for Mangoush and Calls Barqa Military Council 
Illegal”, Quryna, 5 January 2012, www.qurynanew.com/26235. 
93  The al-Sa’eqa special forces battalion from Benghazi rep-
resented an exception in this respect. It joined the revolution 
at an early stage and was later deployed to stabilise the 
Fezzan. 
94  For example the al-Awfiya brigade in Tarhouna, the 138th 
Infantry Brigade in Raqdalein, or the Mashashiya brigade in 
Shgeiga that was integrated into Der’ Libya in November 2012. 
“138th Infantry Brigade Integrated into Libyan Army”, Quryna, 
31 October 2012, www.qurynanew.com/43990. 
95  Discussions, army officers at 2nd Infantry Division and 
defence ministry, Tripoli, March–April 2013. 
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of those regarded as “supporters of the regime” (azlam 
al-nidham).96 Many leading revolutionaries understand 
this to mean all institutions of the former military 
and security apparatus, even including elements who 
switched sides at the beginning of the uprising.97 They 
seek to create institutions that are dominated by revo-
lutionaries and include at most a fraction of the old 
security forces. As already outlined, one section of 
the leadership of the new institutions also pursues an 
explicitly Islamist agenda. 
In Benghazi, this struggle for control of the new 
security sector has fuelled violent tensions. Although 
the series of bombings and killings in Benghazi and 
Darna since early 2012 is partly about revenge (dis-
cussed below under aspects of justice), some of these 
acts are clearly attributable to the power struggle 
between old and new units.98 
Tensions escalated after the shock of the attack on 
the US consulate in Benghazi on 11 September 2012. 
The subsequent demonstrations were directed against 
two of the largest Islamist-leaning revolutionary bri-
gades, whose members suspect police and army offi-
cers of instrumentalising the occasion to gain control 
of some of their weaponry. The brigades hit back by 
taking dozens of officers hostage, in an attempt to 
force the commander of the 1st Infantry Division to 
persuade the demonstrators to withdraw.99 During 
 
96  According to the then leader of SSC Benghazi, Fawzi 
Wanis al-Gaddafi, in April 2012. Similarly, the spokesperson 
of the Western Division of Der’ Libya said in April 2012 that 
the capture of azlam was one of the unit’s central tasks. This 
view was echoed by leading figures in the SSC Tripoli in con-
versations with the author in March and April 2013. Inter-
view with the spokesperson of the Western Division of Der’ 
Libya, 12 April 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUCmfurrs-
M&feature=relmfu; “Leader of SSC Benghazi: SSC to Be Dis-
solved within Six Months if Objectives Achieved”, Quryna, 
4 April 2012, www.qurynanew.com/32554. 
97  A leader of the Office for the Warriors’ Affairs Commis-
sion with a background in the Benghazi Islamist brigades 
said in November 2012: “The army soldiers are all azlam. The 
police are tainted too, they worked for the regime. We need 
to create a new institution out of the SSCs and the best of the 
police. But we need to get rid of most of the police and army.” 
Discussion, Tripoli, November 2012. 
98  “Demonstrations in Benghazi Demand Dissolution of 
Security Organisations”, Libya al-Youm, 7 April 2012, www. 
libya-alyoum.com/news/index.php?id=21&textid=9239; 
“Clashes Between Police and Armed Organisations in Ben-
ghazi”, Quryna, 11 April 2012, qurynanew.com/?p=33033; 
“Anonymous Attack on Military Administration Building in 
Benghazi”, al-Tadhamon, 1 July 2012, tinyurl.com/byk4osr. 
99  The attempt to assassinate the leader of the Barqa military 
council, Hamed al-Hassi, was also likely related to the storm-
the following two months, attacks increased further, 
culminating in the assassination of Benghazi’s police 
chief on 20 November 2012, which in turn triggered 
a new spiral of violence.100 After a lull in January and 
February 2013, attacks against police stations and 
officers in the old institutions resumed. 
The kind of conflicts that arose in Benghazi over 
control of the security apparatus have appeared only 
sporadically in other regions. Only in the north-east 
did the old army structures survive the civil war 
relatively intact. But elsewhere individual networks 
emerging from remnants of the army have come into 
conflict with new forces. For example, in November 
2011 Major-General Khalifa Haftar had himself ap-
pointed chief of staff by a group of officers and a 
month later attempted to take control of Tripoli air-
port from the Zintan brigades.101 He subsequently 
posed as defender of army interests, accusing the 
revolutionary brigades of preventing the rebuilding 
of the armed forces, and denying that the army had 
been a pillar of the regime. Revolutionary leaders sus-
pected Haftar of establishing a military power base 
among army officers in Tarhouna, and in July 2012 he 
escaped an assassination attempt in Benghazi.102 In 
 
ing of the brigades’ bases. Members of the brigades claimed 
that Hassi had personally taken part in the operation. Dis-
cussions, Tripoli, November 2012; “Hamed al-Hassi Escapes 
Assassination Attempt”, al-Tadhamon, 5 November 2012, 
tinyurl.com/b2ua7; “Belkheir: Foreign Actors Behind My 
Kidnap, Kidnappers Received Instructions by Phone”, Quryna, 
23 September 2012, www.qurynanew.com/42346; “Thirty-
three Officers Detained in Benghazi”, al-Tadhamon, 22 Septem-
ber 2012, tinyurl.com/aplzqno; “Members of Army Call Mem-
bers of Rafallah Sahati Heretics”, al-Manara, 25 September 
2012, tinyurl.com/aewqu3x. 
100  After a suspect was detained following the violent death 
of police chief Faraj al-Drisi police stations were attacked 
with the aim of freeing the suspect. “Unknown Assailants 
Murder Colonel Faraj al-Drisi in Front of His House in 
Benghazi”, al-Tadhamon, 20 November 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
bdm22bm; “Benghazi: Dead and Injured after a Bloody 
Night”, al-Manara, 16 December 2012, tinyurl.com/bk4yn9f; 
“Benghazi Rocked by Second Night of Attacks”, Libya Herald, 
17 December  2012. 
101  Haftar joined Gaddafi’s coup in 1969 and commanded 
the Libyan forces in Chad in the 1980s. He was captured there 
in 1987 along with numerous others and cooperated with the 
CIA during the following two decades. When the revolution 
began he returned to Benghazi. 
102  “Haftar to al-Watan al-Libiya: Officials Deliberately Ob-
structing Establishment of Army in Interests of Some States”, 
al-Watan al-Libiya, 21 July 2012, tinyurl.com/a8kpxh3; “Assas-
sination Attempt on Major-General Haftar”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 
30 July 2012, tinyurl.com/b9kjo7p. 
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August 2012, the central SSC put an end to the Tar-
houna officers’ ambitions, seizing more than one 
hundred tanks in the city.103 
Generally speaking, many members of the officer 
class feel marginalised by the chief of staff and the 
revolutionary forces, whether because of their region-
al origins or their role under the former regime. They 
are seeking to position themselves for the rebuilding 
of the armed forces. In December 2012 a series of 
“extraordinary conferences of the Libyan army” was 
held at various venues, with a final declaration calling 
for the dismissal of the chief of staff and his replace-
ment with a collective leadership. The core of the ini-
tiative was formed by officers from Zintan and Cyre-
naica who had switched sides at the beginning of the 
revolution. In April 2013, this constituency – with 
Haftar playing a leading role – founded the Assembly 
of Free Libyan Officers and repeated its earlier de-
mands, providing support to moves within the GNC 
to dismiss the chief of staff.104 
Defence Minister Mohamed al-Barghathi is seeking 
to reconcile the different camps by instituting an “in-
tegrity commission” for the army, headed by officers 
who defected to the revolution early on.105 Even if this 
 
103  In early June 2012 revolutionary units kidnapped the 
commander of the al-Awfiya brigade in Tarhouna, which 
included deserted army officers, civilian recruits and former 
members of Gaddafi’s brigades, and possessed a large stock 
of arms. In response, the al-Awfiya brigade occupied Tripoli 
Airport for several hours before being overpowered by revo-
lutionary forces. During the August 2012 incident a revolu-
tionary force led by units of the central SSC captured more 
than one hundred tanks from the al-Awfiya brigade. As in the 
assault on Bani Walid, the revolutionary camp portrayed 
the operation against the Tarhouna group as a fight against 
azlam. ICG, Divided We Stand (see note 48), 24–27; “The Airport 
Fiasco”, Libya Herald, 8 June 2012; “One Dead and Eight In-
jured Among Security Forces: SSC Tarhouna Takes Control 
of Souq al-Ahad and Discovers Heavy Weaponry”, Quryna, 22 
August 2012, www.qurynanew.com/40448. 
104  In addition to Haftar, one of the most prominent partici-
pants was Hamed al-Hassi (see note 99). Among those attend-
ing the April gathering was Jum’a Sayeh (see note 136), head 
of the GNC defence committee and a GNC member for Azi-
ziya, a constituency dominated by the Warshafana tribe. 
“Fifth Extraordinary Conference to Build Libyan Army De-
mands Dismissal of Chief of Staff”, al-Tadhamon, 30 December 
2012, tinyurl.com/amx6l35; “Foundation of the Assembly of 
Free Libyan Army Officers Announced”, al-Manara, 20 April 
2013, tinyurl.com/boj5z5d. 
105  “Defence Minister Accounces Creation of Integrity and 
Reform Commission in the Libyan Army, Review of the Ten 
Military Regions to Create Four”, Lana, 15.4.2013, tinyurl. 
com/cqlcftc. 
initiative manages to avoid swelling the ranks of dis-
gruntled officers, it remains unclear as of May 2012 
how and in what timeframe the remnants of the old 
armed forces will be integrated with the new units. 
But in view of the acute conflicts between the two 
camps it is evident that integration could further fuel 
tensions. The same goes for the attempts to create a 
new police force out of the SSCs and remnants of the 
old apparatus. Preparations for dissolving the SSCs 
began as early as mid-2012, but met with strong 
resistance.106 
In December 2012 a decree by the deputy prime 
minister – in his capacity as acting interior minister – 
called for the Committees to be dissolved and their 
members integrated into the police through a selec-
tion body. A storm of protest ensued, with SSC leaders 
demanding the formation of a separate force rather 
than integration into what they saw as a discredited 
police service.107 At the beginning of January 2013 
members of the SSC stormed the seat of the National 
Congress and physically assaulted two deputies. Pro-
tests notwithstanding, the integration of SSC forces 
into the police began, proceeding unevenly from city 
to city. In Benghazi about half of the twelve thousand 
SSC members joined the police. The other half split 
into those who had only joined the SSC for the pay, 
and now simply disappeared from the lists, and the 
revolutionary hard core of about three thousand who 
joined Der’ Libya. In Tripoli one part of the revolution-
ary leadership agreed to integration, but a larger 
group resisted and continued to demand the creation 
of a force with a criminal investigations or intelli-
gence mandate.108 In May 2013, the process of dis-
solution and integration is ongoing; the number of 
SSC members has declined significantly; but the 
fundamental issue of how to integrate the hard core 
 
106  Arbitrary arrests by members of the SSCs and their 
apparent complicity with shrine-destroyers generated 
increasing criticism in mid-2012, including among GNC 
members. When the leadership of the SSCs threatened to 
suspend operations because of lack of support from the 
government, Interior Minister Abdel ‘Aal briefly resigned. 
The government gave in to the pressure and stated its formal 
support for the SSCs. ICG, Divided We Stand (see note 48), 13. 
107  “Abdelkarim Decrees Integration of SSC Members in 
Interior Ministry”, al-Tadhamon, 12 December 2012, tiny-
url.com/a2kpazu; “Rejection of Interior Ministry Decision to 
Integrate SSCs: Demands for Formation of Separate Security 
Organ”, al-Manara, 12 December 2012, tinyurl.com/bz6qcjy. 
108  Discussions, leading figures, SSC Tripoli, March and 
April 2013. 
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of revolutionaries into the security forces remains 
unresolved. 
Conflicts over Justice and Reconciliation 
Many of the current conflicts and political tensions 
are associated with questions of justice and the pros-
ecution of crimes. Three aspects stand out: the con-
sequences of the collapse of the judicial system; the 
power struggle over its rebuilding; and the discussion 
over how to deal with the criminal legacy of the old 
regime. 
The collapse of the judicial system is of greatest 
relevance for the current conflicts. Judges and prose-
cutors have been discredited by their role under 
Gaddafi and find themselves physically threatened by 
countless armed groups. In short, the judicial system 
is paralysed. Victims of violence and their families are 
unable to access justice through the courts. Where the 
supposed or actual perpetrator belongs to a different 
group than the victim, families, cities and tribes close 
ranks and often take justice into their own hands. 
This dynamic has contributed to escalation in all local 
conflicts since the fall of the regime. Many are also 
connected with detentions, mostly conducted by revo-
lutionary brigades or new units dominated by them. 
Thousands of individuals accused of crimes as mem-
bers of Gaddafi’s military and security forces are held 
in prisons that are mostly only nominally controlled 
by the government.109 These prisoners largely belong 
to cities and tribes that were on the losing side of the 
revolution. Only a handful of trials of former senior 
officials have already started, and made slow progress 
to date. International human rights organisations and 
lawyers from the International Criminal Court rightly 
point out that leaders of the old regime cannot cur-
rently expect a fair trial from the Libyan courts. But of 
much greater consequence for the country’s stability 
will be the way local conflicts are dealt with. Victors’ 
justice is a distinct possibility, with, for example per-
petrators from Tawergha tried but not those from 
Misrata. 
The case of the assassination of General Abdel 
Fattah Younes in July 2011 illustrates the problems. 
His tribe, the Obeidat, quickly began pressuring the 
 
109  According to the International Crisis Group, seven 
thousand individuals accused of links to the former regime 
are still being held, among them three thousand in facilities 
that are officially under (often only nominal) state control. 
ICG, Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya (Brussels, 2013). 
political leadership to prosecute the perpetrators. 
Younes’s family accused leading NTC members, judges 
and members of Salafi brigades of involvement in the 
general’s detention and subsequent murder.110 A mili-
tary court in Benghazi began an investigation and in 
November 2011 the state prosecutor published a list of 
seventeen suspects, only one of whom was a member 
of the political leadership. After several failed assas-
sination attempts, one suspect was killed in June 2012. 
Meanwhile, the military court decided to broaden the 
investigation to include former political leaders. By 
this point only one of the suspects had been detained, 
while the rest remained at large.111 Protests erupted in 
several cities in December 2012 after the military 
court questioned former NTC president Mustafa Abdel-
jelil over the incident. Under public pressure – but 
probably relieved at being rid of the matter – the mili-
tary court declared itself not competent, leaving the 
case without a responsible court.112 The Obeidat swore 
vengeance and another assassination attempt against 
one of the suspects followed in January 2013.113 
Progress in prosecuting crimes depends not only 
on the establishment of a neutral security apparatus, 
but also on reform of the justice system itself. Rifts 
have emerged on this issue, too. The Supreme Judicial 
Council’s draft law on legal reform proposes dismis-
sing all the country’s judges and having a five-member 
committee examine their records before deciding to 
reappoint or retire them.114 It is hardly surprising this 
proposal has met with stiff opposition from the judi-
ciary – which, in turn, is dismissed by proponents of 
 
110  “Murder of General Younes: A Conspiracy Within the 
State”, correspondents.org (in Arabic), 25 September 2012, www. 
correspondents.org/ar/node/833. 
111  “State Prosecutor Reveals Names of Suspects in Case of 
Assassination of Abdel Fattah Younes and Aides”, Brnieq, 28 
November 2011, tinyurl.com/a9yrkhv; “Investigation of Role 
of Top Transitional Council Leaders in Abdel Fattah Younes 
Murder”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 31 May 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
ao4mowv; “Benghazi Official Linked to Younis Killing Assas-
sinated”, Libya Herald, 21 June 2012. 
112  “Abdel Fattah Younes Case: Libya Tribunal Quits in Jalil 
Row”, BBC News, 20 December 2012. 
113  “Abdel Fattah Younes’ Family: Criminal Prosecution – 
or Revenge”, Quryna, 5 December 2012, www.qurynanew.com/ 
45785; “Man Killed in Car Bomb Murder Attempt against 
Benghazi Islamist”, Libya Herald, 7 January 2013. 
114  The NTC appointed a new Supreme Judicial Council 
after the fall of the regime. Its chair is the president of the 
Supreme Court; other members are the state prosecutor-
general and the presidents of the appeals courts. Draft Law 
on Reorganisation of the Judiciary, www.aladel.gov.ly/main/ 
uploads/sections/352_new-law.pdf. 
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the reform initiative as machinations of the azlam.115 
Observers argue that conducting the committee’s 
work in secrecy would represent an open invitation to 
political influence on judicial appointments.116 Many 
suspect that the Mufti, who is strongly backing the 
proposal, would seek to control the process.117 Justice 
Minister Salah al-Marghani is seeking to ward off such 
political interference, and the draft law has made 
little progress towards adoption. 
With prosecution of serious crimes largely stalled, 
the government has resorted to apparent alternatives 
to work through the legacy of the Gaddafi regime and 
the civil war. Under the law on transitional justice 
of February 2012, the NTC in May 2012 appointed a 
Commission for Truth and National Reconciliation. 
But the law made no specific provisions for criminal 
prosecutions, as the relevant sections on establishing 
courts had been deleted during the drafting process.118 
Apart from establishing local branches, the Commis-
sion has remained inactive. Instead, tribal leaders 
have taken the initiative to make progress on medi-
ation and reconciliation. But in the absence of security 
forces and a judicial system to enforce them, agree-
ments reached by tribal leaders have often quickly 
broken down. Justice Minister Marghani put forward 
a revised transitional justice law in December 2012, 
but protracted discussions in the GNC stalled progress. 
Chief among the disagreements was the question 
whether the law should cover crimes committed by 
the regime until its demise – as the revolutionary 
camp in the GNC was demanding – or those perpe-
trated by all sides until the end of the transitional 
period.119 
Other ways of coming to terms with the past have 
included attempts to bar Gaddafi-era functionaries 
 
115  “Judges and Court Councillors from Benghazi Attempt 
to Prevent Law on Reorganisation of the Libyan Judiciary”, 
al-Manara, 17 October 2012, tinyurl.com/acv66pp; “Judges 
and Court Councillors at Supreme Court and Appeals Courts 
Reject High Judicial Council’s Draft Law on Reorganisation 
of the Judiciary”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 18 November 2012, 
tinyurl.com/auarbz9. 
116  Discussion with law professor Alhadi Bouhamra, Tripoli, 
November 2012. 
117  “Ghariani Warns of Shia Expansion in Libya and Dis-
cusses a Number of Issues with GNC Members”, al-Tadhamon, 
28 April 2013, tinyurl.com/cmu3h56. 
118  Discussion with Salah Marghani, who worked on the 
draft law and later became Justice Minister, Tripoli, June 
2012; Law 17/2012 of the National Transitional Council 
“On Defining Principles of National Reconciliation and 
Transitional Justice”, Tripoli, 26 February 2012. 
119  Discussions with GNC members, Tripoli, April 2013. 
from politics, administration and the public sector. 
To this end, the NTC defined a series of criteria that 
public officials must fulfil, and in January 2012 estab-
lished the so-called Integrity Commission.120 It did so 
in response to heavy public pressure over the presence 
of former Gaddafi-era officials in the NTC and the 
return of former senior bureaucrats. But the Integrity 
Commission’s decisions also provoked heated con-
troversy, especially as it did not reveal its reasons for 
rejecting particular individuals. Some of those con-
cerned simply ignored the decision for months, while 
other rulings were overturned by appeal courts.121 
For the revolutionary camp, on the other hand, the 
activities of the Integrity Commission did not go far 
enough, leading to the aforementioned moves to pass 
a “law on political exclusion” (al-’Azl al-Siyasi). With the 
implementation of the latter law, adopted on 5 May 
2013, the Integrity Commission will be replaced by – 
and its members appointed to head – a new body that 
is set to oversee the law’s enforcement. Under the law, 
a wider range of former officials are to be disbarred 
from public office and political life than under the 
criteria used by the Integrity Commission – in par-
ticular, the new law does not make exceptions for 
former officials who joined the revolution. This is 
likely to trigger a spate of decisions against GNC mem-
bers and other senior officials, and provoke further 
controversies. 
In view of the lack of progress in the legal system 
and the protracted discussions over “political exclu-
sion”, radical forces began taking matters into 
their own hands. Especially in Benghazi and Darna, 
dozens of former members of the domestic intelli-
gence service and Gaddafi’s revolutionary committees 
fell victim to a spate of murders.122 In some cases these 
 
120  The full name is “Supreme Authority for the Implemen-
tation of the Criteria of Integrity and Patriotism” (al-Hai’a 
al-Ulya li-Tatbiq Ma’air al-Nazaha wal-Wataniya); the Commission 
became operational in April 2012. See the corresponding Law 
26/2012 of the National Transitional Council, Tripoli, 4 April 
2012; “National Transitional Council Defines Integrity Cri-
teria for Appointments to State Offices”, al-Manara, 17 Decem-
ber 2011, tinyurl.com/a5wxbpx. 
121  “Declaration of Authority for Implementation of Criteria 
of Integrity and Patriotism: Some Decisions Being Ignored”, 
al-Manara, 1 June 2012, tinyurl.com/ahmoj6p. 
122  The incidents are too numerous to list in detail. Some 
examples: “Benghazi Car Bomb Kills Former Adjutant in 
Domestic Intelligence Service”, Quryna, 13 June 2012, www. 
qurynanew.com/36536; “Top Intelligence Officer Killed, 
Second Injured in Benghazi Car Bomb Blast”, Quryna, 3 Sep-
tember 2012, www.qurynanew.com/41006; “Shots Fired at 
Former Member of Domestic Intelligence Service in Darna”, 
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were probably acts of personal revenge for repression 
at the hands of the regime experienced by Islamists 
and other members of the opposition in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In other cases they are likely to represent 
unilateral political purges. The revolutionary camp – 
especially its Islamist wing – sees the inadequacy of 
action against former regime elements as the prime 
cause of such killings, arguing that the mere presence 
of former regime officials exacerbates tensions.123 A 
wave of kidnappings in Tripoli, Misrata and other 
cities since late 2012 also points to the beginning of 
a cycle of revenge.124 While some abductions are 
motivated by criminal gain, others appear to be direct-
ly related to the search for azlam or retribution for 
crimes.125 As long as this climate prevails and a neu-
tral judicial process remains impossible, initiatives for 
national reconciliation have little prospect of success. 
 
al-Tadhamon, 5 September 2012; “Leader of Darna Revo-
lutionary Committees Murdered”, al-Tadhamon, 31 October 
2012, tinyurl.com/asx9sog; “Retired Major Abdelkarim 
al-Warfalli Killed”, al-Tadhamon, 6 November 2012, tinyurl. 
com/apldxxe; “Benghazi: New Attack Targets Citizens Said to 
Have Connections to Gaddafi’s Domestic Intelligence Service 
”, al-Manara, 8 November 2012, tinyurl.com/anyb4oa; “Leader 
of Darna Revolutionary Committees Killed”, al-Tadhamon, 
19 December 2012, tinyurl.com/bqjf2tt; “Colonel at Security 
Directorate in Benghazi Killed”, al-Tadhamon, 8 April 2013, 
tinyurl.com/c4oxaev. 
123  As one former member of an Islamist brigade in Ben-
ghazi put it: “The members of the former security organs 
should disappear. They are murderers, their presence is 
destabilising. We need the ‘political exclusion’, then the 
killings will stop.” Discussion, November 2012. The Justice 
and Construction Party expressed a similar view: “Justice 
and Construction: Participation of Members of Former 
Regime in Political Process Disrupts National Consensus”, 
al-Manara, 12 December 2012, tinyurl.com/c5c4msa. 
124  ICG, Trial by Error (see note 109), 23. 
125  A senior figure in the SSC Tripoli explained the kidnap-
pings as directly related to the release of former members 
of Gaddafi’s army: “In the months after the fall of Tripoli, we 
arrested many members of Gaddafi’s brigades and intelli-
gence service. When we handed them over to the General 
Prosecutor, they were immediately released without their 
files even being looked at, because the way in which they had 
been arrested was considered illegal. This created deep resent-
ment towards the justice system. We tried to arrest them for-
mally again, but were told by the interior ministry that only 
the police could do that. But of course, the police won’t, 
because they are afraid. This has led to the wave of kidnap-
pings.” Discussion, Tripoli, April 2013. 
An Emerging Area of Conflict: 
The Economy and Public Sector 
The economy is beginning to emerge as another area 
of conflict, principally over state expenditure and the 
public sector, property rights and control of smug-
gling. The latter is already the subject of armed con-
flict. 
Libya’s economy depends almost entirely on state 
spending funded by oil revenues. Distributive policies 
take a variety of forms: subsidies on food, fuel, elec-
tricity and water; investment in infrastructure and 
housing; employment in the public and parastatal 
sectors; pensions and social benefits. While invest-
ment in infrastructure has been largely suspended 
since the civil war and – as of May 2013 – has yet to 
resume, other expenditure items have risen sharply. 
After Gaddafi doubled public sector salaries in March 
2011 and local councils and local branches of govern-
ment ministries temporarily recruited new staff after 
the revolution, the salary budget rose to 19 billion 
dinars (u11 billion) in 2012, from 8 billion dinars in 
2010.126 This figure does not include payments to 
the new units under the umbrella of the defence and 
interior ministries, which added around 200,000 
salary recipients. The NTC sought to enhance its popu-
larity with one-off payments to the entire population 
to mark public holidays.127 The GNC has followed the 
NTC’s example on several occasions. It has also mas-
sively increased social allowances that are paid out to 
the whole population, like child benefit, women’s and 
housing allowances.128 While real or supposed revo-
lutionaries expect to receive financial benefits for 
demobilising, the Warrior’s Affairs Commission has 
further raised such expectations.129 Representatives 
of revolutionary war invalids occupied the GNC for 
weeks in February and March 2013, with a highly suc-
cessful result,130 and veterans of the Chad war have 
 
126  “Kib Government Spent Five Billion Dinars on Furni-
ture”, Quryna, 7 January 2013, www.qurynanew.com/47187. 
127  Law 10/2012 of National Transitional Council, “On Pay-
ment of a Sum of Money to Libya’s Families on the Occasion 
of the First Anniversary of the 17th February Revolution”, 
Tripoli, 15 February 2012. 
128  “Following Proposal from Justice and Construction: 
National Congress Amends Family and Housing Benefit For 
Libyan Citizens”, al-Manara, 6 November 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
bburz5d. 
129  “LD 500 Million Project Being Prepared” (see note 91). 
130  The war-wounded were promised monthly payments of 
LD2000 for life and also provided with vehicles and homes. 
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also mobilised to demand benefits.131 The current 
institutional chaos offers diverse opportunities for 
manipulating or embezzling such payments. 
Local demands are beginning to produce distribu-
tive conflicts. Local councils negotiate their budgets 
with the government on a case-by-case basis, thereby 
entering into competition with each other. The oil 
workers’ union and other pressure groups in Benghazi 
are negotiating with the government about moving 
the headquarters of the National Oil Corporation 
(NOC) to Benghazi, and they can rely on broad politi-
cal support in the city.132 Armed protests to press 
material demands are becoming ever more frequent, 
with groups claiming to represent the interests of 
particular cities, tribes or brigades occupying oil 
fields, refineries or export terminals and bringing 
production to a halt.133 Some of the units that have 
deployed to protect oil-producing areas have begun 
extorting protection money, and at times have clashed 
with each other over the lucrative business of securing 
individual oilfields.134 The government is highly vul-
nerable to such demands; a harsh response would only 
risk escalation. Overall, there is a trend towards a 
massive expansion in state expenditure and the public 
sector. The government’s increasing generosity under-
lines its weakness. 
 
“Cabinet Makes Concessions to War Invalids”, Quryna, 
22 February 2013, www.qurynanew.com/49258. 
131  “Tripoli Receives Plan for Payments to Chad War Veter-
ans”, al-Tadhamon, 1 November 2012, tinyurl.com/a5chbtv. 
132  “Benghazi Union Rejects Minister and Demands NOC 
Headquarters”, Libya Herald, 12 December 2012. 
133  The occupation of the Zueitina Terminal near Ajdabiya 
in December 2012 and January 2013 by a small group of 
armed demonstrators caused losses of about $25 million. 
“Al-Aroussi: Protests at Zueitina Oil Port Causing Daily Loss 
of $1.3 Million”, Quryna, 8 January 2013, www.qurynanew. 
com/47240. Another example is the protests at Ubari. “Tebu 
Say Obari Oil Field Protest Over after Meeting with Minister”, 
Libya Herald, 19 December 2012. 
134  Many units deployed around oil and gas facilities since 
the revolution have been recruited from civilians, and are 
officially part of the Guard Force for Borders and Vital Facili-
ties (the border guard). While also receiving payments from 
the defence ministry, they have generally established much 
more profitable arrangements with oil companies, which 
can border on protection rackets. Discussions with oil execu-
tives and former members of revolutionary brigades, Tripoli, 
November 2012 to March 2013. “Armed Men from Zintan 
Prevent AGOCO Aircraft Landing at Hamada Oil Field”, 
Quryna, 7 December 2012, www.qurynanew.com/45911; 
“Work at Ghani and Dahra Oilfields Suspended Due to Secu-
rity Problems”, al-Tadhamon, 21 March 2013, tinyurl.com/ 
cewqoh2. 
The fault lines of the revolution also come to fore 
in public-sector distributive conflicts. The purges of 
the former elites from state-owned enterprises are 
still ongoing, and expanding into second-tier manage-
ment. Some dismissals have occurred at the initiative 
of government and the Integrity Commission, others 
under pressure from employees or the public. The first 
generation of executives appointed during or after the 
revolution is now also coming in for public criticism. 
Employees have demanded managerial resignations 
for reasons ranging from incompetence to personal 
rivalry, but many accusations revolve around involve-
ment with the former regime.135 
Power struggles between rival networks over ap-
pointments to vacated posts are only just beginning, 
with individuals associated with Mahmoud Jibril’s net-
works, who were given lucrative posts after the revo-
lution, coming under pressure.136 Kib’s ministers also 
 
135  Sharp controversies flared around the steering commit-
tees appointed by the NTC to run the major state investment 
funds. There were vociferous protests against Mahmoud 
Jibril’s re-appointment of Rafik al-Nayed as chief executive 
of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). Nayed had already 
held the post since late 2010, and has close family ties to 
Jibril. His successor Mohsen Derija, who cannot be accused of 
connections to the old regime, quickly alienated the remain-
ing LIA staff. Derija was dismissed by Zeidan in February 
2013, but for almost two months defied the decision and con-
tinued to visit his office with an armed group from his home 
city of Misrata, before giving in. The new chief executive of 
the Libyan African Investment Portfolio, Ahmed Kashada, 
who had made his career at the LIA, is criticised for his family 
ties to Gaddafi confidant Mustafa Kharroubi. “After Gaddafi: 
A Spent Force”, Financial Times, 8 September 2011; “LIA Staff 
Demonstrate for Protection of Libyan People’s Funds”, 
al-Watan al-Libiya, 1 July 2012, tinyurl.com/aqnlaeb; “Zeidan: 
I Have Decided to Dismiss the Chief Executives of the LIA 
and the Social Solidarity Fund”, al-Tadhamon, 1 March 2013, 
tinyurl.com/ccva25v. 
136  Alongside al-Nayed, for example, Faraj al-Sayeh, chief 
executive of the Social Solidarity Fund since late 2011, also 
belongs to Jibril’s network, with whom he served on the 
Economic Development Board during the Gaddafi era. He 
faces tenacious resistance among Fund staff. During the revo-
lution al-Sayeh was one of Jibril’s closest confidants in the 
executive committee of the Transitional Council. Al-Sayeh’s 
brother Jum’a was elected to the GNC as an independent with 
the support of Jibril’s Alliance. Another example is Wafiq 
al-Shater, who Jibril appointed to the stabilisation committee 
during the revolution member and is now chief executive of 
LAP Green, the state telecommunications investment fund. 
Al-Shater’s father Abderrahman belonged to the Alliance for 
a time with his party, and was also elected to the GNC as 
an independent. In April 2013, Abderrahman Shater’s GNC 
membership was suspended by the Integrity Commission. 
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appointed their allies to positions in companies they 
were responsible for, and these individuals now find 
themselves exposed to similar ambitions on the part 
of their successors under Zeidan. Misratan business 
networks, which are strongly represented in the large 
state-owned enterprises, are facing Integrity Commis-
sion decisions to remove some of their prominent 
representatives from key posts.137 The giant conglom-
erates that manage state investments in infrastructure 
and housing were at a standstill until early 2013, and 
as they resume operations the appointment of new 
executives is likely to provoke struggles among polit-
ical elites. But the big corporations cannot recom-
mence normal operations until the corrupt structures 
in which many of their contracts are mired have been 
cleaned up. Investigating committees have been to do 
this, but have yet to present results.138 
In addition, conflicts over property rights are 
emerging, and these too run along the fault lines 
of the revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s 
Gaddafi nationalised and redistributed private prop-
erty on a grand scale. This policy destroyed the power 
base of the traditional elite and bourgeoisie, which 
fled abroad to form a large part of the exile opposi-
tion. The former owners have returned with the 
revolution, often in leading political or military roles, 
and are exerting strong pressure. While a committee 
is examining the problem, many former owners have 
begun repossessing their land or buildings by force.139 
Given that the current occupants are often socially 
 
ruption and Aberrations”, Quryna, 4 October 2012, www. 
qurynanew.com/15015. 
137  In December 2012, the Integrity Commission ordered 
the suspension of Mahmoud Badi, Chairman of the Economic 
and Social Development Fund (ESDF), and in April 2013, the 
suspension of Abdelhamid Dabeiba, General Manager of 
Libyan Investment and Development Holding Co. (LIDCO). 
Dabeiba already held his post during the Gaddafi era, while 
Badi held other senior positions. During the revolution, both 
funded revolutionary brigades in their home city, Misrata. 
Dabeiba and Badi have remained in their posts and are 
appealing the decisions. 
138  “Libya Probing Oil Firms’ Contracts under Gaddafi”, 
Reuters, 9 April 2012; “Transitional Government Sets Up Com-
mittee to Investigate Existing State Contracts”, al-Tadhamon, 
24 June 2012, tinyurl.com/b8utpft. 
139  “First Session of Committee to Investigate Proposal to 
Annul Law 4/1978”, al-Watan al-Libiya, 15 March 2012, tiny-
url.com/beew6fn; “Thousands of Libyans Struggle with 
Recovery of Property Confiscated by Qaddafi”, New York Times, 
13 May 2012; “Federation of Property Owners: We Demand 
Restoration of Law Amended by Gaddafi”, al-Tadhamon, 14 
November 2012, tinyurl.com/a5qsbkf. 
disadvantaged families who had benefited from 
Gaddafi’s measures, the handling of this problem 
will decide whether the group of losers (and potential 
opponents) of the revolution grows still larger. 
Conflicts over economic resources are already 
acute in the field of illicit activities, with competition 
for control of smuggling routes one cause of clashes 
between Toubou and Zuwayya in Kufra, between 
Awlad Suleiman and Gaddadfa in Sabha, and between 
Zuwara and Nawail on the Libyan-Tunisian border.140 
Subsidised products (food and fuel), as well as vehicles 
– for which import duties were abolished with the 
revolution – make up the bulk of goods smuggled 
out of Libya.141 Arms and drug smuggling have also 
increased enormously since the fall of the regime, and 
members of the security forces risk their lives combat-
ing heavily armed smuggling gangs.142 
 
 
 
140  Cole, Borderline Chaos? (see note 69). 
141  Libya’s budget for explicit subsidies was 14 billion dinars 
(u8.2 billion) in 2012. Libya’s National Planning Institute esti-
mates that one third of all subsidised products are smuggled 
abroad. 
142  “Libya Closes Umm Saad Border Crossing After Numer-
ous Attacks on Security Forces by Smugglers”, Quryna, 1 July 
2012, www.qurynanew.com/37513; “Border Security Officer 
Assassinated in Benghazi”, Libya Herald, 5 July 2012; “Mem-
bers of Border Force 71 Demand Intervention by Authorities 
to Protect Them”, al-Tadhamon, 1 October 2012, tinyurl.com/ 
baavhw4; “Commander of Border Guard Visits Those Injured 
in Attack on Tamanhant Base”, Quryna, 2 April 2013, www. 
qurynanew.com/50617. 
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Conclusions 
 
The matrix of a power struggle between Islamist and 
secular/liberal forces, into which some observers try 
to squeeze the political dynamics of the new Libya, is 
misleading. First, because local interest groups domi-
nate the political landscape; second, because the 
dominant fault line is that of the revolution and 
civil war. The divide runs between a camp seeking 
to monopolise the uprising’s gains, and the actual 
or potential losers of a continuing revolution. It runs 
right through Libya’s elites, and threatens to separate 
cities and tribes into winners and losers. 
The balance of power is still in the making, but 
the rifts opened up by the civil wars could define the 
political dynamic for years and become a lasting 
source of tension. They are also likely to dominate the 
upcoming constitutional process. The distribution of 
power among local actors is set to be among the most 
controversial issues, entwining questions of decen-
tralisation, federalism and ethnic minority rights. 
Questions concerning Islam and its role in legislation 
are much less conflict-laden, as secular political forces 
play no role in Libya, and conservative interpretations 
of Islam enjoy wide support. 
External actors are of secondary importance in the 
political dynamics unfolding in this complex situation 
– although the way they are perceived in Libya is very 
different. Many suspect the machinations of foreign 
governments behind the new political forces. Repre-
sentatives of individual cities, ethnic minorities, fed-
eralists, parties, and militias are all regarded by their 
respective opponents as the agents of various external 
powers. International actors were well advised to tread 
a cautious path after the NATO intervention, and the 
UN support mission (UNSMIL) still operates above all 
in an advisory capacity. 
A still unresolved balance of forces, institutional 
chaos and a fragmented political landscape also 
present obstacles to stronger external engagement. 
Outside support for the security sector is hampered by 
the politicisation of individual units and institutions. 
Despite these difficulties, foreign governments, the 
European Union and UNSMIL are already competing 
for the favour of the Libyan government in their offers 
to reform the security sector or train and equip 
individual units. In some cases this has instead 
worsened confusion in the security sector. 
In view of the acute conflicts in the country, sup-
port in rebuilding the security sector should remain 
a priority of bilateral and European cooperation. But 
such assistance must take account of politicisation 
and tensions within the sector. In this context, sup-
porting individual units and institutions is associated 
with risks; assistance in establishing structures for 
control and accountability in the security sector could 
be more appropriate in the current situation. Bilateral 
initiatives should be closely coordinated with the 
European Union and UNSMIL, to avoid overtaxing the 
complex structures on the Libyan side. Generally, ex-
ternal support should not be addressed to individual 
actors, but designed to create structures and forums 
that contribute to resolving the conflicts between the 
political forces of the new Libya. 
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Glossary 
Al-Asala “Authenticity”; Salafi movement associated 
with the Grand Mufti 
Azlam (al-nidham) Supporters (of the regime) 
Constitutional 
Committee 
Planned committee of sixty members (twenty 
from each region) to prepare a constitution, to 
be elected directly by the people 
Constitutional 
Declaration 
Timetable for the transitional process of draft-
ing a constitution and preparing elections, 
announced by the Transitional Council in 
August 2011 
Der’ Libya “Libya Shield Forces” – military units com-
posed of former revolutionary brigades, under 
the chief of staff 
Executive committee Temporary government of the Transitional 
Council, headed by Mahmoud Jibril, March–
November 2011 
General National 
Congress (GNC) 
Temporary parliament, elected in July 2012 
Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG) 
Insurgent group active in the 1990s; most 
members exiled, imprisoned or killed by the 
late 1990s. 
Local council Self-appointed or elected local organ estab-
lished during and after the civil war 
Military council Local military organ with civilian and military 
members, established during and after the 
civil war 
National Forces 
Alliance 
Alliance of parties led by Mahmoud Jibril; 
strongest bloc in the GNC 
National Transitional 
Council (NTC) 
Political leadership of the revolution, led by 
Mustafa Abdeljelil, established late February/ 
early March 2011, dissolved at the first session 
of the GNC in August 2012 
Shura council Local council of tribal elders and/or other 
prominent figures 
Supreme Security 
Committees (SSCs) 
Units composed of revolutionary brigades and 
militias, under the authority of the Interior 
Ministry 
Transitional 
government 
Government of Abdel Rahim al-Kib, appointed 
by the Transitional Council, November 2011 to 
November 2012 
 
